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TOWARD A HORIZONTAL FIDUCIARY DUTY IN
CORPORATE LAW
Asaf Eckstein† & Gideon Parchomovsky††
Fiduciary duty is arguably the single most important as-
pect of our corporate law system.  It consists of two distinct
subduties—a duty of care and a duty of loyalty—and it ap-
plies to all directors and corporate officers.  Yet, under extant
law, the duty only applies vertically, in the relationship be-
tween directors and corporate officers and the firm.  At pre-
sent, there exists no horizontal fiduciary duty: directors and
corporate officers owe no fiduciary duty to each other.  Conse-
quently, if one of them fails her peers, they cannot seek direct
legal recourse against her even when they stand to suffer
significant reputational and financial losses.  This state of af-
fairs is undesirable not only from a fairness perspective, but
also from an efficiency standpoint as it raises governance
costs for firms and may undermine their ability to attract skill-
ful officers and directors.
In this Article, we call for the introduction of a horizontal
fiduciary duty among directors and corporate officers.  The
proposed duty would complement, rather than replace, the
fiduciary duty that corporate officers owe the corporation and
the shareholders.  We argue that the institution of a horizontal
fiduciary duty would (1) lead to improved decision making and
information sharing on boards; (2) enable board members to
vindicate themselves in situations in which another board
member is the one to breach the fiduciary duty; (3) attract
more capable individuals to serve as directors; and (4) improve
corporate management and governance.
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INTRODUCTION
The duty of care and the duty of loyalty are the twin pillars
on which corporate law is constituted.1  Together, they form the
fiduciary duty that guides and binds every corporate officer and
director.2  The duty of care requires directors and officers to
exercise the level of care that a prudent person would use
under similar circumstances.3  The duty of loyalty requires di-
rectors and officers to refrain from benefiting themselves at the
expense of the corporation that they serve.4  Critically, though,
both duties are one-dimensional.  They only apply vertically in
the relationship between the duty-bearers and the corpora-
tion.5  They do not avail horizontally in the relationship among
corporate officers and directors inter se.
1 See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986) (“In performing their
duties the directors owe fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the
corporation and its shareholders.”).
2 See Marcia M. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the
Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606
(1987).
3 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005).
4 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“Corporate officers and
directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further
their private interests.”).
5 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (“Duty of
care and duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors
to act in the service of a corporation and its stockholders.”).
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This Article calls for the recognition of a horizontal duty of
care and a duty of loyalty among directors and corporate of-
ficers inter se.  The new duty we envision is supposed to com-
plement, not replace, the duties directors and officers owe to
the corporation.
To understand the motivation behind our proposal, one
only needs to recall the classic cases of Smith v. Van Gorkom6
and In re Walt Disney.7 Van Gorkom involved a successful
challenge to the sale of Trans Union, a Delaware corporation.8
The transaction was masterminded by Mr. Van Gorkom, the
CEO and chairman of the board of Trans Union, who was “fa-
miliar with acquisition procedures, valuation methods, and ne-
gotiations.”9  Van Gorkom recommended the proposed
transaction.10  His opinion carried great weight with his col-
leagues and, following a two hour discussion, the board ap-
proved the sale and its terms.11  Pursuant to the board’s
approval, a class action was filed against Trans Union and its
board.12  At the heart of the challenge lies the agreed upon sale
price of $55 per share that Van Gorkom and Trans Union’s
chief financial officer had agreed upon without any research or
external validation.13  A majority of the Delaware Supreme
Court accepted the class action, ruling that the board breached
its fiduciary duty by making an ill-informed decision.14  De-
spite the fact that Van Gorkom was the driving force behind the
decision and the other directors played a merely passive role,
the court did not differentiate among the board members in
terms of their responsibility for the decision and assigned col-
lective liability to all of them.15  In the aftermath of the litiga-
tion, the directors agreed to pay $23 million to the plaintiffs as
6 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
7 Disney, 907 A.2d 693; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27,
66–67 (Del. 2006).
8 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
9 Id. at 866.
10 Id.
11 See id. at 869.
12 Id. at 863–64.
13 Id. at 877.
14 Id. at 893; Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About
C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate
Charters, 96 NW U. L. REV. 607, 614–15 (2002) (citing Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
894) (observing that the “Trans Union’s Directors have been the victims of a ‘fast
shuffle’ by Van Gorkom and Pritzker [the acquirer].”).
15 It should be noted that in this case, the directors elected to defend them-
selves collectively. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889.
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part of a settlement that was entered between the parties.16
Van Gorkom, by not disclosing material information to his
peers, failed them.  But he owed them no fiduciary duty and
they could not seek legal recourse against him.
The (in)famous case of Disney involved a derivative suit
against Disney’s directors and officers for damages allegedly
caused by the 1995 hiring of Michael Ovitz as the President of
The Walt Disney Company and his 1996 firing.17  In this case,
Michael Eisner, Disney’s Chairman and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, and Irwin Russell, a director and head of the compensa-
tion committee, approached Ovitz about joining Disney and
entered into negotiations with him.18  By mid-July 1995, those
negotiations were in full swing.  Raymond Watson, a member of
Disney’s compensation committee and a former Disney board
chairman helped structure Ovitz’s compensation package.19  In
September 1995, the committee voted unanimously to approve
the Ovitz Employment Agreement’s terms.20  Although the
board, as a whole, approved Ovitz’s hiring, it was clear that
Eisner and Watson orchestrated the deal.21  They possessed
intimate knowledge about the terms of the deal and the other
directors clearly deferred to their superior knowledge and ex-
pertise.22  After less than a year Ovitz was terminated without
cause and, due to the way in which his compensation package
16 Stephen A. Radin, The Director’s Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 719 (1988).
17 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006).
18 Id. at 36.
19 Id. at 38.
20 Id. at 40.
21 At first phases, “Eisner never called a board meeting for the specific pur-
pose of discussing the possibility of hiring Ovitz, but at various times Eisner did
contact board members on an individual basis.” In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 699 n.6 (Del. Ch. 2005).  As noted, “Eisner was ‘on a hunt’ to
bring Ovitz to Disney.” Id. at 702 (footnote omitted) (quoting Tr. 4173:24-4175:12
(Eisner)). “Russell, per Eisner’s direction, assumed the lead role in negotiating the
financial terms of the contract.” Id.  “Up until this point, only three members of
Disney’s board of directors were in the know concerning the status of the negotia-
tions with Ovitz or the particulars of the OEA[—]Eisner, Russell and Watson.” Id.
at 706.  Russell, Raymond Watson, and Graef Crystal were responsible for con-
ducting analysis of Ovitz’s employment agreement. Id. at 704.  Eisner and Wat-
son led the discussions and explanations to Disney’s board regarding Ovitz’s
employment agreement. See id. at 710.
22 Before approving Ovitz’s employment agreement, Watson presented to the
Compensation committee the process underlining the OEA.  Some of the commit-
tee’s members “could not recall whether Watson had actually distributed copies
of” spreadsheet analysis performed by him, Id. at 709 n.82, but they testified “that
they believed they had received sufficient information from Russell’s and Watson’s
presentations,” Id. at 709.
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was structured, he walked away with $130 million.23  The
Chancery Court imposed no liability on the board, explaining
that the directors “were at most ordinarily negligent,”24 but “did
not act in bad faith,”25 and were thus sheltered from liability by
the business judgment rule.26  At the same time, the court was
highly critical of the board, noting that “[f]or the future, many
lessons of what not to do can be learned from defendants’ con-
duct here,”27 and expressing hope “that this case will serve to
inform stockholders, directors and officers of how the Com-
pany’s fiduciaries underperformed.”28  The Supreme Court
echoed this criticism, expressing its dissatisfaction with Dis-
ney’s directors and officers.29  So, while the defendants es-
caped legal liability, their reputations were severely tarnished
and their prospects of serving on future boards were dimin-
ished.30  In this case too, the court chastised the board collec-
tively, even though some of directors clearly shouldered more
blame than others.  In the absence of a horizontal fiduciary
duty, though, they had no ready way of exonerating themselves
and no hope of setting the record straight.
These and many other cases represent the realities of cor-
porate boards.  Although boards are often portrayed as mono-
lithic entities comprised of equal peers, this ideal portrayal is a
far cry from the real world, where boards are comprised of
members with different skill sets, experiences, leverages, and
personalities.31  Board decisions are the product of the interac-
tion among directors.32  And, although individual directors can
disagree with each other, it is a well-known fact that there is
23 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006).
24 Disney, 907 A.2d  at 760.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 772.
29 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, at 66–67 (Del. 2006).
30 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919 (1998) (noting that “[w]hile litigation
is unlikely to cost [corporate managers and directors] their jobs, liability can
damage their reputations and future careers”); see also Edward B. Rock, Saints
and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009,
1104 (1997) (explaining how “[a] system that relies on public shaming is perfectly
suited to such contexts: The cost to the actor—the disdain in the eyes of one’s
acquaintances, the loss of directorships, the harm to one’s reputation—may often
be sufficiently great to deter behavior, even without anything more”).
31 See infra subpart III.A.
32 See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the
Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 101, 107–08 (1985) (describing the collective nature of boards of
directors).
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strong pressure on boards to acquiesce and play along.33  This
is especially true when the decision at hand falls within the
domain of expertise of a particular board member and the
board operates under conditions of exigency.
Furthermore, in discharging their duties toward the firm,
directors must invariably depend on other corporate officers.34
Directors usually do not have access to independent informa-
tion sources and they normally do not engage in specific fact
finding about the day-to-day operations of the firm.35  Typi-
cally, the board rests its decisions on information it receives
from the other organs of the firm.36  The successful operation of
boards, therefore, necessitates an environment of trust within
the firm.  The same is true, albeit to a lesser degree, of other
corporate officers.  Corporate officers possess expertise in cer-
tain areas, such as business, engineering, accounting or law,
but they, too, must rely on their peers in matters that fall
outside of these areas or in making decisions that depend on
factual predicates that they cannot independently verify.
This, of course, raises the question whether liability for
breaches of fiduciary duty is assigned individually or collec-
tively.  Surprisingly, extant law on the nature of civil liability of
directors and corporate officers is unclear.37  The consensus
among corporate law scholars is that in cases involving
breaches of the duty of care, courts tend to treat the board as a
unitary whole and assign responsibility to all directors collec-
tively, whereas in cases of breach of the duty of loyalty, liability
is assessed individually.38  Yet, a careful perusal of the caselaw
33 See, e.g., Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1257–93 (2003) (discussing the board’s contribution to
Enron’s failure)); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive
Review, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 821, 824, 851–65 (2004) (elucidating the phenomenon of
“structural bias,” which “refers to the prejudice that members of the board of
directors may have in favor of one another” and calling to apply a judicial review of
the substantive merit of directors’ decision making in cases involving structural
bias).
34 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? - Group Decision making in
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (noting that directors delegate
responsibility to top management and monitor their performance).
35 See id. at 5 (explaining that “[t]he modern public corporation is too big for
the board to manage on . . . a day-to-day basis”).
36 See id. at 7 (describing the information gathering and monitoring process
of corporations).
37 Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Direc-
tors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929, 935 (2008) (“Existing law on the individual/collective
question is difficult to decipher.”).
38 Id. at 935 (“Duty of loyalty claims tend to be analyzed using an individual
approach, while duty of care claims tend to be analyzed using a collective ap-
proach.”); see also Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the
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reveals a more nuanced picture under which the choice be-
tween collective and individual liability is largely case specific,
depending on the legal context and the claims involved.39  As a
result of the uncertainty that surrounds directors’ liability, all
directors are potentially exposed to the liability for breaches of
fiduciary duty even if they were not actively involved in the
problematic conduct or omission.  Indeed, liability may even be
assigned to absentee directors40 and dissenting directors
whose dissent has not been recorded in the minutes.41  Worse
yet, even board members who choose to resign in response to a
decision they opposed are not immune from liability.42
The tendency to view board members collectively is much
more pronounced in administrative and criminal actions.43
When launching an investigation against a corporation for sus-
pected illicit activities, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other law en-
forcement agencies approach the board as a single entity and
do not distinguish among individual board members in terms
of their responsibility.44  Many investigations end up in plea
agreements and pretrial diversion agreements, specifically de-
ferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements45 that as-
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1178 n.39 (1990) (suggesting that “[a] duty
of care violation is likely to involve the entire board, whereas a duty of loyalty
violation tends to be limited to directors (typically insiders) who have personally
benefited from a transaction”).
39 For discussion, see Part I, infra.
40 Ibrahim, supra note 37, at 933 & 933 n.11. R
41 Thus, with regard to payments made in violation of dividend restrictions,
the Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 174(a) (2001) states that: “Any director who may have
been absent when [an unlawful dividend or stock repurchase] was done, or who
may have dissented from the act or resolution by which the same was done, may
be exonerated from such liability by causing his or her dissent to be entered on
the books containing the minutes of the proceedings of the directors at the time
the same was done, or immediately after such director has notice of the same.”
See also JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 1253 (2d ed., 2003).
42 See Rich ex rel. Fuqi Inter., Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 980 n.138
(Del. Ch. 2013) (holding that directors would not be “automatically exonerated
because of their resignations”); see also In re Puda Coal Stockholders’ Litig., C.A.
No. 6476-CS, at 16:9–11 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (bench ruling) (holding that three
directors that resigned “leave the company under the sole dominion of a person
they believe has pervasively breached his fiduciary duty”).
43 Infra note 129. R
44 Id.
45 Under deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, corpora-
tions admit to criminal wrongdoing and agree to pay monetary sanctions while
avoiding formal conviction. See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Gov-
ernance Regulation through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 325 (2017)
(describing common arrangements in which “the prosecutor agrees not to pursue
a criminal conviction of a firm, but nevertheless typically imposes financial sanc-
tions on the firm. In return, the firm usually agrees to cooperate in the investiga-
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sign blame to the board as a whole without apportioning it
among its members.  Individual board members who wish to
dissociate themselves from the failures of their colleagues and
clear their names have no means of legal redress.  Under cur-
rent law, there is no cause of action they can assert.
To address the plight of individual directors and corporate
officers, and to improve corporate governance more generally,
we call for the recognition of a fiduciary duty among directors
and corporate officers vis-à-vis one another.  Directors, by vir-
tue of their shared responsibility, must rely on each other and
trust one another to carry out their duties successfully.  Fail-
ure by one director to dutifully perform her tasks is liable to
affect other directors.  The successful operation of boards is
predicated, in other words, on a system of trust.  It stands to
reason, therefore, that directors should owe each other a fidu-
ciary duty.  The implementation of our proposal would have
enabled the passive directors in Van Gorkom and In re Disney
to seek legal recourse against the directors who breached their
trust and led them astray.  Similarly, it would allow directors,
whose companies were implicated in criminal and regulatory
violations, to prove that they were not involved in the wrongdo-
ing and seek recompense from board members who suppressed
information from them or misled them for the reputational and
other harms they have suffered.
The introduction of a horizontal fiduciary duty among cor-
porate officers and directors would have four salutary effects.
First, the fiduciary duty we propose would firm up the incen-
tives of corporate officers and directors to be diligent in the
performance of their duties.  This, in turn, would lead to im-
proved information-sharing and decision making on boards.
Second, the independent cause of action we seek to create
would enable individual board members to vindicate them-
selves and restore their reputation if they were led astray or
misled by their peers.  Third, it would attract more capable
individuals to serve on boards, at a lower cost to the corpora-
tion itself.  Giving individual directors an independent cause of
action that protects their reputation should increase the will-
ingness of skilled individuals to act as directors and reduce the
compensation they require.  Fourth, and most importantly, em-
powering individual directors to sue for breach of fiduciary
tion and admit to the facts of the crime”); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (2007) (arguing that deferred prosecution
agreements and non-prosecution agreements still impose rigorous requirements
on corporations).
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duty is liable to improve corporate management across the
board.  Corporate officers and directors have superior informa-
tion about the corporation and can bring to light evidence that
other plaintiffs may not be able to produce.46  The threat of
being sued by a fellow officer or director would consequently
improve the diligence and heighten the loyalty exercised by all
board members and corporate officers.  Importantly, our pro-
posal would give corporate officers and directors who were
harmed by the misdeeds and omissions of their colleagues an
independent cause of action exercisable irrespective of harm to
the corporation itself.47
Structurally, the Article unfolds in five parts.  In Part I, we
discuss the duties of corporate officers and directors.  In Part II,
we explore the contours of officers’ and directors’ liability for
breaches of the duties owed to the corporation.  In Part III, we
unveil the internal dynamics that exist within firms and ex-
plain how they affect individual choices and collective decision
making.  In Part IV, we introduce our proposal to recognize a
horizontal fiduciary duty that will avail among corporate of-
ficers and directors vis-à-vis one another.  In Part V, we assess
the impact of exculpation, insurance, and indemnification ar-
rangements on our proposal.  A short conclusion ensues.
46 In that respect see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Common Chal-
lenges Facing Shareholder Suits in Europe and the United States, 6 EUR. COMPANY
& FIN. L. REV. 348, 355 (2009) (discussing the informational constraints faced by
plaintiffs in derivative suits); Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to
Fix Shareholder Litigation By Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1,
53–54 (2015) (“The defendants, after all, possess all relevant information about
what, in fact, triggered the relief. The plaintiffs do not.”).
47 One may argue, at this point, that the availability of directors and officers
insurance as well as exculpatory clauses renders our proposal superfluous.  Di-
rectors are insured against losses resulting from breaches of their fiduciary duties
and are therefore indifferent to their exposure to liability. This argument is flawed
for several reasons.  First, directors and officers insurance is not available in all
corporations.  Second, cases of recklessness, gross negligence, and intent are
generally excluded from coverage.  Relatedly, a judicial determination of directors’
way of acting is not an exact science and even directors that were not reckless or
grossly negligent are exposed to the risk of judicial mistakes.  Third, liability
findings affect directors’ future insurance premiums.  Fourth, insurance does not
offer adequate coverage for reputational harms and lost future opportunities to
serve on boards resulting therefrom.  Fifth, and finally, insurance is costly.  It
exists to address cases of failure.  Policymakers should therefore strive to improve
the mechanisms of corporate governance and not increase reliance on insurance.
For further discussion, see Part V.
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I
THE INCREASING LEGAL EXPOSURE OF DIRECTORS AND
CORPORATE OFFICERS
The law views directors and corporate officers as fiducia-
ries of the corporation and its shareholders.48  The imposition
of a fiduciary duty on directors and officers is intended to align
their interests with those of the corporation and ensure that
they act with the best interest of the corporation in mind.49
The fiduciary duty of directors and officers is typically broken
down into two specific duties: a duty of care and a duty of
loyalty.50  The duty of care requires a fiduciary to be aware of
all reasonably available material information before making a
business decision.51  The fiduciary must act with a level of care
that an ordinarily careful and prudent person would employ
under similar circumstances.52  In reviewing whether a director
or an officer has satisfied her duty of care, courts have ex-
amined the informational basis available to a director and the
decision making process followed by the board.53
The duty of loyalty has been defined by Delaware courts in
broad and unyielding terms, requiring “an undivided and un-
selfish loyalty to the corporation [and] demand[ing] that there
48 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
49 The need to align interests of officers and directors with those of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders is the heart of the well-known agency problem result-
ing from the separation of ownership and control.  For an explanation of the
agency problem in business firms, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–43 (1976) (discussing agency costs alongside the agency
problem); John Armour, Henry Hansman & Reiner Kraakman, What Is Corporate
Law, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 2 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that “much
of corporate law can usefully be understood as responding to three principal
sources of opportunism: [among them] conflicts between managers and
shareholders”).
50 See Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (“Corporate officers and directors are not permit-
ted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.
While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation
and its stockholders.”  (emphasis added)).  This is the case not only in Delaware
but also in other states.
51 STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF COR-
PORATE DIRECTORS 1 (6th ed., 2009).
52 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005).
53 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871 (Del. 1985) (finding directors
liable for not making informed and deliberate decisions); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[D]irectors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to
making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to
them.”).  For a detailed description of the evolution of duty of care, see Stephen J.
Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589,
594–99 (2006) (focusing on the “inherent tension in corporate law between discre-
tion and accountability” as a framework for the development of the duty of care).
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. . . be no conflict between duty and self-interest.”54  The duty of
loyalty imposes both affirmative and negative obligations on
the duty-bearer.  Affirmatively, it tasks a corporate officer or
director with the responsibility “to protect the interests of the
corporation committed to his charge” with the highest level of
scrupulousness.55  Negatively, it prohibits a corporate officer or
director from “work[ing] injury to the corporation, or . . .
depriv[ing] it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability
might properly bring to it, or . . . enabl[ing] it to make in the
reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.”56  Stated in more
general terms, the duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing by di-
rectors and officers and requires that they act in good faith and
in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best interests
of the corporation and its stockholders.57  Some have even ar-
gued for a broader definition of the duty of loyalty, suggesting
that it should be construed as mandating an “affirmative devo-
tion” to the firm.58
While the twin duties of care and loyalty have been part
and parcel of our corporate law ever since its inception,59 in the
last few decades two important developments have combined to
enhance the legal exposure of directors and officers to civil
suits and criminal and administrative enforcement actions in-
volving claims of breaches of the duty of care and duty of loy-
alty.  First, there was a paradigm shift from board-centric to
54 Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
55 Id.
56 Id; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 257–58 (Del. 2000) (affirming
dismissal of breach of loyalty claims based upon evidence of lack of personal
benefit to director who approved the transaction).
57 Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del.
1987) (holding that directors have an “affirmative duty to protect the interests of
the corporation, but also an obligation to refrain from conduct which would injure
the corporation and its stockholders or deprive them of profit or advantage.  In
short, directors must eschew any conflict between duty and self-interest”).  For
further discussion, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin
Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 634 (2010) (“[I]t has been traditional
for the duty of loyalty to be articulated capaciously, in a manner that emphasizes
not only the obligation of a loyal fiduciary to refrain from advantaging herself at
the expense of the corporation but, just as importantly, to act affirmatively to
further the corporation’s best interests.”).  Finally, see Lyman Johnson, After
Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27,
37–42 (2003) (discussing the various meanings of loyalty).
58 See Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 882
(2017) (defining this specific “strand” of corporate loyalty as one that advances the
firm’s particular purposes).
59 See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795 (1983) (“[T]he
fiduciary duties of partners, corporate directors, and officers originated with the
formation of partnerships and corporations . . . .”).
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shareholder-centric governance of public companies.60  Share-
holder activism in the U.S. has increased significantly over the
past several years.61  Prompted at least in part by calls from the
legal academy,62 “institutional investors have become much
more open to hearing from, and supporting, ‘activist’ investors
who have amassed significant investments in companies and
who purport to know better than management and the incum-
bent board the steps a company should be taking to increase
shareholder value.”63  This change in the behavior of institu-
tional investors has resulted in, among other things, an in-
crease in the number of suits brought against directors and
officers and has resulted in greater scrutiny of boards, manage-
ments, and their operations.64
Second, the DOJ, SEC, and other governmental agencies
have stepped up their enforcement efforts against U.S. compa-
nies and foreign companies listed in the U.S.65  In February
2017, the DOJ’s Criminal Division Fraud Section issued a new
guideline for the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Pro-
60 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1911–26 (2013) (describing the transformation of the
U.S. system from manager-centric to a shareholder-centric model).
61 See Joseph Fuller, How Activist Investors (Like Carl Icahn) Became Power-
ful Business Forces, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2015, 12:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2015/11/17/how-activist-investors-like-carl-icahn
-became-powerful-business-forces/#5fde935742be [https://perma.cc/3DLL-
FZLH] (“[A]ctivist investors pulled off a remarkable metamorphosis over the course
of a generation.  Once reviled as villains operating on the fringes of the market,
they are now powerful forces at work in the mainstream of business.”).
62 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV 833, 851 (2005).
63 Marc S. Gerber, US Corporate Governance: Board of Directors Face In-
creased Scrutiny, SKADDEN’S 2014 INSIGHTS-GOVERNANCE (Jan. 16, 2014), https://
www.skadden.com/insights/us-corporate-governance-boards-directors-face-in-
creased-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/V6NC-KS2H]; see also Joseph Fuller, How
Activists Investors (Like Carl Icahn) Became Powerful Business Force, FORBES (Nov.
17, 2015, 12:17 PM) (noting that “it was the many institutional investors who
eventually embraced activists in their search for better returns who gave these
hedge funds their real clout”); Charles Nathan, Debunking Myths About Activist
Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 15, 2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/15/debunking-myths-about-ac-
tivist-investors/ [https://perma.cc/R7UP-3UK8] (“In fact, perhaps the most im-
portant change in the activist investor game plan over the past several years has
been the increasingly sympathetic hearing activists receive from conventional
institutional investors.”).
64 Gerber, supra note 63.
65 See, e.g., Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder
Litigation Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
1217, 1220 (2012) (“Between 1977 and 2007, there were a total of approximately
105 [FCPA] actions . . . . [Between 2007 and 2012], DOJ and the SEC have
brought over 230 enforcement actions, with more investigations pending” (foot-
note omitted)).
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grams.66  The guideline includes key compliance program eval-
uation topics and questions that prosecutors should consider
in “conducting an investigation of a corporate entity, determin-
ing whether to bring charges, and negotiating plea or other
agreements.”67  Among other topics, the guideline puts strong
emphasis on the oversight duty of directors.68  It invites prose-
cutors to examine the expertise of board members in compli-
ance issues and the manner in which they discharged their
oversight responsibilities.69  The enforcement campaigns
against U.S. corporations often result in pretrial diversion
agreements, under which a firm admits to wrongdoing and
agrees to pay hefty fines in exchange, for being put on proba-
tion for several years.70
The criminal and administrative enforcement actions
taken against U.S. companies typically fuel private lawsuits
against the companies involved.71  Indeed, in this context, ad-
ministrative and criminal actions and civil suits are inextrica-
bly related.72  Admission of wrongdoing by corporations as part
of their agreements with the authorities constitute the factual
basis for follow-on shareholder suits against directors and of-
ficers.73  Shareholder litigation frequently follows a company’s
announcement of an investigation by enforcement agencies.74
As former SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar acutely observed,
66 U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, Evaluation
of Corporate Compliance Programs, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/
page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/37DB-RB9U] (last updated Aug.
16, 2017).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 45, at 334; Garrett, supra note 45, at 888; R
Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
497, 515–27 (2015).
71 See Griffith, supra note 46, at 9–10 (2015) (“Derivative suits follow fast R
upon corporate mishaps and are often filed in the wake of . . . enforcement actions
by regulators or prosecutors and mimic allegations made in the prior action.
Claims of this type therefore have been labeled ‘tag-along’ derivative suits.” (foot-
note omitted)).
72 See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 65, at 1228 (showing that “[t]wo dozen R
FCPA-related shareholder suits were filed in 2010 alone”); see also Griffith, supra
note 46, at 54 (2015) (explaining how “in cases where regulators or prosecutors R
extract corporate governance relief in the wake of a failure of corporate compli-
ance, as indeed they often do, shareholder litigation over the same events is
fundamentally duplicative”).
73 See Westbrook, supra note 65, at 1227 (“Some [shareholder] suits are R
triggered by disclosure of FCPA settlements with the SEC and DOJ.”).
74 See id. (“Other shareholder suits are triggered earlier, by the announce-
ment of a government FCPA investigation.”).
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directors “fulfill [their] responsibilities with the threat of law-
suits hanging over [their] head.”75  This trend is likely to inten-
sify in the future, with every case that settles reinforcing the
motivation to sue and collect ever larger amounts.76
The growing exposure of corporate officers and directors to
liability and the rise in criminal and administrative enforce-
ment against corporations implies that boards and corporate
officers may be found responsible for the actions and omissions
of their peers.  As we will show in Part II, under the present
legal environment, any violation of the law or breach of duty by
an individual within a firm may generate adverse consequences
for other organs in the firm, leaving a collective taint on their
reputations and diminishing their future employability.
II
THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF DIRECTORS’ AND
OFFICERS’ LIABILITY
In analyzing directors’ and corporate officers’ liability for a
breach of their fiduciary duties, the first question that needs to
be addressed is whether liability is assessed individually or
collectively.  Under an individual liability regime, each director
bears legal responsibility for her actions or inactions, and fail-
ure by one director to discharge her duties does not adversely
affect other directors.  Under a collective liability standard, the
board is considered a single, inseparable organ for liability pur-
poses and a lapse by one board member can taint all other
members.
As we will explain, the nature of directors’ liability does not
lend itself to simple classifications.  Rather, it is highly
nuanced and contextualized.  In approaching this question,
one first needs to distinguish between acts and omissions of
the board.  Insofar as acts are concerned, it is necessary to
draw a second distinction between violations of the duty of care
and violations of the duty of loyalty.  Both Roberta Romano77
75 Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, The Important Work of Boards of
Directors, Address at the 12th Annual Boardroom Summit and Peer Exchange,
New York, NY (Oct. 14, 2015).
76 See, e.g., Judy Greenwald, Multimillion-Dollar Shareholder Derivative Settle-
ments Drive Litigation Boom, BUS. INS. (Feb. 1, 2015), available at http://
www.businessinsurance.com/article/20150201/NEWS06/302019996 [https://
perma.cc/Q66S-AXYV] (noting that “multimillion-dollar settlements of share-
holder derivative lawsuits are expected to lead to more litigation and even larger
settlements”).
77 Romano, supra note 38, at 1178 n.39. R
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and Darien Ibrahim78 have suggested that, as a general rule,
courts tend to assign collective liability in cases involving viola-
tions of the duty of care and individual liability in cases involv-
ing breaches of the duty of loyalty.
In cases of omission or oversight failure, liability is as-
sessed collectively not only for breaches of the duty of care but
also for breaches of the duty of loyalty.79  When a board fails to
detect misconduct by management, the failure, by its very na-
ture, cannot be typically charged to a single director and the
board as a whole will bear responsibility for the omission.
One may suggest that our investigation into the precise
nature of directors’ liability is largely theoretical since active
decisions of the board fall under the business judgment rule
and omissions give rise to liability only in those rare cases in
which the board utterly failed to implement a reporting system
or consciously ignore red flags.  Hence, from a practical stand-
point, the issue of directors’ liability does not arise.  This con-
clusion is erroneous.
Let us begin with the business judgment rule.  At the heart
of the rule lies the presumption that “in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action was
in the best interest of the company.”80  As long as this pre-
sumption has not been rebutted, courts will defer to the deci-
sions of the board and corporate officers.81  The business
judgment rule insulates officers and directors from liability for
a business decision made in good faith if they are not person-
ally interested in the subject of the business judgment, are
informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment
to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate under
78 Ibrahim, supra note 37, at 935. R
79 See, e.g., Cottrell ex rel. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Duke, 829 F.3d 983, 986
(8th Cir. 2016) (“Owners of shares of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) sued direc-
tors and officers of the corporation, accusing them of breaking state and federal
law by permitting and then covering up pervasive bribery committed on behalf of
Wal-Mart’s Mexican subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico (Wal-Mex).”); Horman v. Ab-
ney, No. 12290-VCS 2017, Del. Ch. LEXIS 13, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017)
(“Stockholders of United Parcel Service, Inc. (‘UPS’ or ‘the Company’) have brought
this derivative action on behalf of the Company against members of its Board of
Directors (the ‘Board’) alleging that they breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by
consciously failing to monitor and manage UPS’s compliance with state and fed-
eral laws governing the transportation and delivery of cigarettes.”).
80 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
81 See id. (stating that the board’s decision will be upheld when the decision
can be attributed to a rational business purpose and there is no evidence of fraud,
bad faith, or self-dealing).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 16 31-JUL-19 13:09
818 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:803
the circumstances, and rationally believe that the business
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.82  The bus-
iness-judgment rule protects “well-meaning directors who are
misinformed, misguided, and honestly mistaken” from judicial
second-guessing, except in rare case where “a transaction may
be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the
test of business judgment.”83
Critically, the business judgment rule only protects direc-
tors’ decisions that are: (1) adequately informed; (2) made in
good faith; and (3) in rational belief that they further the inter-
est of company.84  If one of the aforementioned elements is
missing, the business judgment rule will not apply and the
decision will be scrutinized under the much stricter entire fair-
ness test.  The entire fairness test requires defendants to prove
that the transaction was “ ‘entirely fair’ to the corporation and
its shareholders”85 and “requires the Court to strictly scruti-
nize all aspects of a transaction to ensure fairness.”86  Of the
three prerequisites for the application of the business judg-
ment rule, the first—that the decision was adequately in-
formed—has proven to be the main stumbling block for boards.
Smith v. Van Gorkom is a case in point. As we have already
discussed at length,87 in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware
Supreme Court ruled that the board’s decision to price the
shares of the target company at $55 per share was not ade-
quately informed and thus was not entitled to the benefit of the
business judgment rule.88 Smith v. Van Gorkom is not the only
case in which the court suspended the business judgment rule.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor89 is another famous decision in
which the Delaware Supreme Court found that the business
judgment rule does not apply to the decision of the board.90
The facts of the case resembled those of Van Gorkom.  In this
case, Technicolor, a Delaware corporation, was acquired by
MacAndrews & Forbes Group (MAF), another Delaware corpo-
ration.91  The transaction was initiated by Fred Sullivan, a
82 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Corrpro Cos., 478 F.3d 557, 572 (3d
Cir. 2007).
83 FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999); Aronson, 473 A.2d
at 815.
84 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials, 478 F.3d at 572.
85 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 747 (Del. Ch. 2005).
86 RADIN, supra note 51, at 69. R
87 See text accompanying notes 9–15. R
88 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874, 888 (Del. 1985).
89 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993).
90 Id. at 350–51.
91 Id. at 349.
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Technicolor director, who introduced Technicolor’s CEO and
Chairman of the board, Morton Kamerman, to Ronald O. Perel-
man, MAF’s Chairman and controlling shareholder.92  For this
contribution, Sullivan received a “finder’s fee” of $150,000.93
From that point on, the transaction was driven almost exclu-
sively by Technicolor’s CEO and Chairman of the Board, Mor-
ton Kamerman.94  At the conclusion of a short meeting,
Technicolor’s board rubber-stamped the terms of the acquisi-
tion and gave it its blessing.95
Adopting the Chancery court findings,96 the Delaware Su-
preme Court ruled that “all the directors had presumably
breached their duty of care.”97  The Court explained that the
duty of the directors to act on an informed basis is a necessary
prerequisite for the application of element of the business judg-
ment rule, and that it “requires a director, before voting on a
proposed plan of merger or sale, to inform himself and his
fellow directors of all material information that is reasonably
available to them.”98
There are, of course, other reported cases from Delaware
and other states in which courts refused to apply the business
judgment rule to board decisions.99  It is worth noting that the
question of whether the rule applies to officers’ decision mak-
ing has remained an open question—both in the academic
literature and in case law.100
92 Id. at 352–53.
93 Id. at 355.
94 Id. at 355–56.
95 Id. at 357.
96 Id. at 367, 370.
97 Id. at 358.
98 Id. at 368; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
99 See e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (explaining that in the context of anti-takeover measures, directors “must
show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed because of another person’s stock ownership”);
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (1986) (declin-
ing to apply the business judgment rule when dissolution of the firm was “inevita-
ble”); Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass’n, 21 Cal. 4th
249, 259 (1999)  (applying a rule of “judicial deference to community association
board decisionmaking that would apply, regardless of an association’s corporate
status, when owners in common interest developments seek to litigate ordinary
maintenance decisions entrusted to the discretion of their associations’ boards of
directors,” as opposed to the classic business judgment rule).
100 Amitai Aviram, Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and the Nature of Corporate Or-
gans, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 765–66 (2013) (discussing this and related ques-
tions and concluding that answers to these questions depend on the classification
of officers as organs or agents); see also Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers
and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW 439, 440 (2005) (arguing that the
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Additionally, the scope of the business judgment rule may
be influenced by extralegal forces.  Interestingly, Sean Griffith
has hypothesized that “in periods of scandal and crisis, corpo-
rate law judges manipulate doctrine to increase management
accountability in hopes of quieting calls for federal interven-
tion.”101  If this hypothesis is correct, then during periods of
economic downturn courts may show less deference to the bus-
iness judgments of corporate officers and directors.
It should also be borne in mind that many suits against
corporate boards and officers ultimately settle outside of the
court, despite the existence of the business judgment rule.102
Such settlements occur because the rule does grant board de-
cisions full and complete immunity from liability.  In many
cases, there is uncertainty about the applicability of the busi-
ness judgment rule and litigants sometime prefer to address
this uncertainty by settling.103
Finally, the business judgment rule does not provide
boards with protection against reputational harms.  And as
Jonathan Macey put it, in addition to directors’ concerns about
their personal liability for negligence or malfeasance, directors
“also are concerned about their reputations as leaders and
their standing in the community.  In other words, the prevail-
ing norms of director behavior are stricter and less forgiving
than the liability rules by which directors are evaluated.”104  It
bears emphasis that even a ruling that gives directors the bene-
fit of the business judgment rule may represent a dear reputa-
tional price for the directors involved.
The decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery in In re
Disney provides a vivid illustration of this possibility.  Recall
that in In re Disney, the directors won on all counts.105  Yet, in
many ways, it was a Pyrrhic victory.  The court included in its
decision a scathing criticism of the directors and their behav-
business judgment rule does not and should not apply to officers in the same
broad scope it applied to directors).
101 Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 57 (2005) (footnote omitted); see
also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 642 (2003)
(explaining that “as if positioning itself in relation to the looming federal threat, or
so as not to provoke a Congress at impasse into action, Delaware hedges its bet,
zigzagging between managers and shareholders”).
102 See Griffith, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that “[t]he vast majority” of share- R
holder litigation “claims settle”).
103 Id.
104 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BRO-
KEN 52 (2008).
105 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 779 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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ior.  Chancellor William B. Chandler wrote that “many lessons
of what not to do can be learned from the defendants’ con-
duct,”106 and expressed hope “that this case will serve to in-
form stockholders, directors and officers of how the Company’s
fiduciaries underperformed.”107  Furthermore, the Chancellor
included in the decision evidence suggesting that several of the
defendants lacked the competency to serve as directors.108  In
an age in which court decisions are carefully monitored, docu-
mented and scrutinized by the media, such statements con-
tinue to reverberate for a long time and can change the
fortunes of individual directors.  It should be added in this vein
that there is a growing tendency among courts to criticize
boards and corporate officers.109
Now turn to oversight liability.  Under Delaware caselaw,
directors may be liable for a breach of the duty of loyalty if they
fail, in bad faith, to implement an information reporting system
mechanism within the firm, or monitor the information flows
therein.110  Oversight liability has been dubbed by the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery as “possibly the most difficult theory in
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a
judgment.”111  The doctrine of oversight liability originated in
the case of In re Caremark Litigation Inc. Derivative Litiga-
tion.112  The case arose from an investigation launched by the
DOJ into Caremark’s practice of paying doctors in exchange for
referrals.113  Caremark ultimately agreed to pay approximately
$250 million to settle the case.114  The Delaware Court of
Chancery approved the settlement.115  En route to this result,
Chancellor Allen opined that “only a sustained or systematic
failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and re-
porting system exits—will establish the lack of good faith that
is a necessary condition to liability.”116
106 Id. at 760.
107 Id. at 772.
108 See id. at 761 & n.488.
109 See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1811, 1832–57 (2001) (discussing the growing use of court opinions written
to “shame” corporate managers and directors).
110 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.
1996).
111 Id. at 967.
112 Id. at 970.
113 Id. at 963.
114 Id. at 960–61.
115 Id. at 959, 972.
116 Id. at 971.
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A decade later, the Delaware Supreme Court refined the
standard of liability in Stone v. Ritter.117  In Stone, the share-
holders of the AmSouth Bancorporation brought a derivative
suit against the directors of the company, alleging that they
failed to detect various violations of the federal Bank Secrecy
Act and various anti-money-laundering regulations by com-
pany employees that triggered a $50 million fine.118  The Chan-
cery Court refused to impose liability on the directors based on
Caremark.119  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court af-
firmed.120  It added that liability for oversight will arise only in
cases of utter failure on the part of the board to ensure the
existence of information-reporting systems or if the board con-
sciously elected to ignore red flags that were brought to its
attention.121  Under Delaware law, therefore, plaintiffs who
bring oversight claims face an uphill battle.
Yet, it is a mistake to assume that directors are immune
from oversight claims.  In In re Countrywide Financial Corpora-
tion Derivative Litigation, the court suggested the failure to ob-
serve and address flagrant and repeated violations of
underwriting standards in the presence of firm-specific red
flags by several directors who served on important committees
on the company, may support a finding of scienter or deliberate
recklessness.122  Although the suit was subsequently dis-
missed for lack of standing,123 it suggests that oversight claims
may succeed in the future.  In the context of oversight liability,
too, it is important to be mindful of the reputational harm to
directors.
More importantly, the discussion so far ignores a critical
legal risk against which neither the business judgment rule nor
the stringent requirements of oversight liability protects direc-
tors: enforcement actions by the DOJ, SEC, and other adminis-
trative agencies.  Once the DOJ or the SEC launches an
investigation against a certain company, a cloud of suspicion
immediately hangs over the heads of the members of board.
Investigations of corporate wrongdoing take years to complete.
In 2016, the median duration of FCPA enforcement actions was
117 See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del.
2006).
118 Id. at 365.
119 Id. at 364–65.
120 Id. at 365.
121 Id. at 370.
122 In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044,
1062–64 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
123 Id. at 1083.
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4.25 years,124 and according to the General Accounting Office
report the investigation of certain FCPA violations “could take
up to 10 years.”125  While an investigation against a company is
ongoing, the directors must live with the negative repercus-
sions that accompany enforcement actions and can do very
little to dispel the legal uncertainty that shrouds them.
But this is just the beginning of the directors’ and corpo-
rate officers’ legal Via Dolorosa.  Most of the DOJ and SEC
investigations lead to pretrial diversion agreements, under
which a corporation admits to certain counts of wrongdoing in
exchange for the payment of a penalty and a promise to imple-
ment corrective measures to prevent recidivism.126  Critically,
for our purposes, such agreements treat board misdeeds as
collective failures.  Enforcement agencies are not interested in
apportioning individual blame; rather, they focus on whether
or not a corporation broke the law.127  Determinations of indi-
vidual liability fall beyond the purview of the investigation and
are considered a waste of public resources.128  Enforcement
authorities do not award citations to individual directors who
acted diligently and do not bother to exculpate them.
Moreover, the corporations against whom the investigation
is carried out are eager to see it through and they too are
uninterested in clearing individual directors of allegations of
wrongdoing.  Pretrial diversion agreements typically contain a
clause stating that the company involved accepts responsibility
“for the acts of its officers, directors, employees and agents as
charged.”129  Similarly, public reports of the company in-
124 The Gray Cloud of FCPA Scrutiny Lasted Too Long In 2016, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 6, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/gray-cloud-fcpa-scrutiny-lasted-long-
2016/ [https://perma.cc/B9SW-CB28].
125 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-636T, CORPORATE CRIME: PRELIMI-
NARY OBSERVATIONS ON DOJ’S USE AND OVERSIGHT OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 9 (June 25, 2009).
126 Koehler, supra note 70. R
127 Id. at 530 (“Despite such rhetoric, there is a wide gap between FCPA en-
forcement against business organizations and enforcement against individuals
employed by the entity resolving the corporate action.”).  Koehler also demon-
strates how “since the DOJ first used an alternative resolution vehicle in Decem-
ber 2004 to resolve an FCPA enforcement action against a business organization,
there have been 84 criminal FCPA enforcement actions against business organi-
zations . . . [however] 76% [of them] did not involve any related criminal prosecu-
tion of company employees.” Id. at 538.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶2, United States v. Och-Ziff
Capital Mgmt. Group LLC, No. 16-CR-00516 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/file/899306/download  [https://perma.cc/NRX6-KBA9]
(including clause that no employee, officer, or agent will contradict acceptance of
responsibility); United States v. Lloyds Banking Group PLC, Deferred Prosecution
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volved—such as annual, quarterly, and current reports—also
state that the DOJ or the SEC are now conducting an investiga-
tion into the activities of the corporation, without offering fur-
ther details as to the identity of the individuals (managers or
directors) involved.130  In other words, the corporation and its
organs become an inseparable whole.  Hence, enforcement ac-
tions leave a collective indelible taint on the board as a whole,
which in turn diminishes its members’ prospect of being
reelected.
Agreement  (July 28, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/
836371/download [https://perma.cc/GZ38-ENV4] (including similar clause de-
tailing company’s liability for all agents); United States v. Deutsche Bank AG,
Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 2 (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/05/22/2014-04-23-deutsche-
bank-deferred-prosecution-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW7Q-TVGD] (in-
cluding similar clause); United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. and HSBC Hold-
ings PLC, Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 2 (Dec. 10, 2012), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/83246/000119312512499980/
d453978dex101.htm [https://perma.cc/57AU-L2WB] (including similar clause).
130 See, e.g., KBR, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Oct. 31, 2008), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1357615/000114036108024084/form10-
q.htm [https://perma.cc/YX82-8QSP] (“The SEC is conducting a formal investi-
gation into whether improper payments were made to government officials in
Nigeria through the use of agents or subcontractors in connection with the con-
struction and subsequent expansion by TSKJ of a multibillion dollar natural gas
liquefaction complex and related facilities at Bonny Island in Rivers State, Nigeria.
The DOJ is also conducting a related criminal investigation.”); Och-Ziff Capital
Management Group LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Nov. 2, 2016), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1403256/000140325616000197/
0001403256-16-000197-index.htm [https://perma.cc/KN7P-NN55]
Since 2011, the Company has been investigated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the ‘SEC’) and the U.S. Department of
Justice (the ‘DOJ’) concerning possible violations of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (the ‘FCPA’) and other laws.  The investigation
concerns an investment by a foreign sovereign wealth fund in some
of the Och-Ziff funds in 2007 and investments by some of the funds,
both directly and indirectly, in a number of companies in Africa.
While the Company is unable to predict the full scope, duration or
outcome of the SEC and DOJ investigation, it believes that it is
reasonably likely that the outcome would include the government
pursuing remedies.  The Company expects to enter into discussions
to resolve any actions that may arise out of the investigation at the
appropriate time in the future.  The SEC and DOJ have a broad
range of civil and criminal sanctions available to them under the
FCPA and other laws.  The Company is currently unable to estimate
the range of possible loss.  While the ultimate impact of any sanc-
tions that may arise cannot be estimated at this time, any such
resolution could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s
business and its consolidated financial statements.
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III
UNPACKING FIRMS
Corporations are often viewed as collective legal entities,
comprised of various organs.  The organs, primarily the man-
agement and board of directors, chart the course for the corpo-
ration, manage its affairs, and supervise its operations.
Corporate organs, however, consist of individuals with diver-
gent backgrounds, expertise, and personalities.  The decisions
made by corporate organs are the product of their interactions
and the resulting dynamics.  Unsurprisingly, the ability of cer-
tain individuals to affect outcomes and shape corporate poli-
cies is far greater than others.  And, while all corporate officers
and directors are responsible for the fortunes of the firm, credit
and blame often should not be equally apportioned.
In this Part, we examine how the individual composition of
corporate organs affects decision making processes within
firms.  We turn to the caselaw to demonstrate how differences
in expertise, skills, and personalities shape policies within the
firm.  Then, we unveil the challenge faced by directors and
officers who disagree with their peers.  In this respect, we show
that dissenting corporate officers and directors have built in
incentives to align themselves with the majority.
A. Individual and Collective Decision Making
Independent thinking by directors and corporate officers is
believed to improve the quality of the decisions made within a
firm.131  In keeping with this belief, the number of independent
directors on public company boards has risen exponentially
over the last few decades.132  Yet, in reality, independence is an
elusive goal.  As we will show in this subsection, the dynamics
of collective decison-making processes exert substantial pres-
sure on directors to conform.  We will then demonstrate that
the dynamics that characterize interactions among directors
also apply to other corporate officers, albeit to a lesser extent.
131 See Michael Useem, How Well-Run Boards Make Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Nov. 2006) https://hbr.org/2006/11/how-well-run-boards-make-decisions
[https://perma.cc/GLJ4-BKY5].
132 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1465, 1475 (2007) (reporting that the percentage of independent directors on the
boards of large public companies has risen from 20% in 1950 to 75% in 2005).
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1. Directors
The board of directors is typically viewed as a collective
entity.133  Court decisions and academic articles alike often
refer to the board as a single, monolithic organ tasked with
performing certain duties for the shareholders.134  Similarly,
the performance of the board is often assessed on a collective
basis; the individual members of the board often do not receive
separate discussion.135  The success of a board is attributed to
all its members indiscriminately and all members bear respon-
sibility collectively in cases of failure.136  Unfortunately, this
view ignores the reality of boards.
Boards are comprised of individuals, who widely diverge in
their skillsets, professional experiences, and personalities.  As
Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach have correctly observed,
“[e]ach board of directors is likely to have its own dynamics, a
function of many factors including the personalities and rela-
tionships among the directors, their backgrounds and skills,
and their incentives and connections.”137  These differences
among directors have profound impact on the operation of
boards.  Although, formally, all directors have equal powers
and equal responsibilities, members with unique expertise in
matters that are brought before the board or who possess su-
perior information about them, naturally carry a lot more
weight in board discussions and exert disproportionate influ-
ence on board decisions.  In the proceeding paragraphs we will
substantiate our claim that boards are not monolithic entities,
but rather human amalgams consisting of diverse individuals
with complementary skills.  We will then elaborate on the rea-
sons that make certain directors carry disproportionate weight
on the board in particular settings and analyze the risk such
cases present to other directors by reviewing cases in which
this risk materialized.
133 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (reaching
conclusion about “the Board of Directors” as a whole).
134 Id.
135 See id. (assessing the collective behavior of “[t]he directors” as opposed to
individual directors.).
136 Id.
137 Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role
of Boards of Directors in  Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and
Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58, 81 (2010).
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a. Different Skill Sets
Expertise and experience are the principal criteria by
which board members are selected.138  Directors with divergent
skill sets and experiences can dramatically improve the func-
tioning of the board and the company as a whole.139  Insofar as
skill sets are concerned, it is customary to distinguish between
financial and legal expertise.140  Naturally, directors with ex-
tensive experience in finance or investment banking will invari-
ably be given deference in decisions pertaining to corporate
finance, merger and acquisitions, and other deals that require
finance-oriented thinking.141  Similarly, directors with legal
training will play a more dominant role when a company faces
a legal challenge.142  Of course, in many companies the break-
down goes beyond financial and legal expertise.  For example,
expertise in accounting is distinguishable from financial acu-
men and is valued in its own right.143  Likewise, legal expertise
can be divided into subspecializations, such as corporate gov-
ernance and modern compliance.  Moreover, directors often
have industry specific expertise.144  For example, in pharma-
ceutical companies, there will be board members who are inti-
mately familiar with the pharmaceutical industry and its
intricacies.  The same is true for corporations operating in
other sectors of the economy.
138 See, e.g., Keren Bar-Hava, Feng Gu, & Baruch Lev, The Virtues of Fewer
Directorships 9 (Maastricht University Graduate School of Business and Econom-
ics, Research Memorandum No. 037, 2013) (describing an “increased demand for
qualified, experienced directors”).
139 See, e.g., Baysinger & Butler, supra note 32, at 121 (noting that “the most R
appropriate board composition, although variable from firm to firm in response to
differing circumstances, includes a mixture of various types of directors”); see
also Julie Hembrock Daum, Building a Balanced Board, SPENCERSTUART 72–73
(Feb. 2015), https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/building-a-
balanced-board [https://perma.cc/3BV9-MUY9]  (pointing out that “boards with
a good mix of age, experience, and backgrounds tend to foster better debate and
decision-making and less groupthink”).
140 See Baysinger &  Butler, supra note 32, at 112  (distinguishing between R
“financiers” and “lawyers,” among many other categories of directors).
141 See Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 137, at 83 (explaining that
firms add bankers to their boards because bankers “can provide financial
expertise”).
142 See Cassandra D. Marshall, Are Dissenting Directors Rewarded? (Aug. 28,
2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University) https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1668642 [https://perma.cc/5XSW-
ZBEF].
143 Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 137, at 83. R
144 See Bar-Hava, Gu & Lev, supra note 138, at 1 (noting that the court R
scrutinized directors’ expertise under regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley).
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Reliance on expertise and deference to knowledge are not
problematic per se.  On the contrary, it often the key to suc-
cess.  As Jill Fisch astutely noted, in the modern business
world “[b]oards that include directors with technical expertise,
industry background, or experience in comparable business
issues, provide a CEO with a team of experts . . . [whose] input
can enhance corporate decisionmaking and prevent costly mis-
takes.”145  But there is also an obvious downside to deference
to expertise: when the expert-director errs in her judgment or,
worse, acts in bad faith or in a conflict of interest that is not
disclosed to the board, she can lead the entire board astray.  In
such cases, the misjudgment may expose all board members to
liability.  For example, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the merger
transaction was architected by Van Gorkom, who had exten-
sive experience in mergers and acquisitions.  As the Delaware
Supreme Court explained, “[h]e was familiar with acquisition
procedures, valuation methods, and negotiations; and he pri-
vately considered the pros and cons of whether Trans Union
should seek a privately or publicly-held purchaser.”146  He was
also the one who determined the price at which the Trans
Union shares would be tendered.147  The other directors de-
ferred to Van Gorkom’s judgment.148  Indeed, Van Gorkom’s
experience in the field of finance clothed his judgment with an
air of inviolability—at least in the eyes of the other board
members.149
Similarly, in a recent Delaware case several AIG board
members hatched an elaborate financial scheme involving “se-
cret offshore subsidiaries to mask AIG losses.”150  The case
involved board members Maurice R. Greenberg, the CEO and
Chairman of the board, and Edward E. Matthews, who served
on AIG’s board for almost thirty years, was Vice Chairman of
Investments and Financial Services, and was described by the
court as “deeply sophisticated in financial investments, and,
due to his lengthy experience with AIG’s insurance operations,
privy to and involved in financial investment strategies and
145 Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 285–86
(1997).
146 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866 (1985).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 869.
149 See Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s,
Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96
NW U. L. REV. 607, 618 (2002) (suggesting that “the board erred in placing too
much trust” in Van Gorkom”).
150 In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Consol. Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763, 775 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
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product developments that were innovative, risky in nature, or
sizable in scope.”151  As the Court of Chancery pointed out, the
other board members were blindsided by the deviant plan of
Greenberg and his cronies because “Greenberg and the Inner
Circle Defendants employed their expertise in illicit ways that
ultimately resulted in billions of dollars of harm to AIG.”152
Given the financial complexity of the cover up scheme, it is not
surprising that the other board members did not challenge it
and later on were dragged into “the flurry of inquiries.”153
Finally, in the Enron litigation, the poster child of corpo-
rate law gone wrong, the company made use of a dubious ac-
counting method known as “mark-to-market” in order to inflate
the value of the company.154  Enron also engaged in a variety of
cover-up tactics intended to hide losses and fabricate earnings,
via the creation of, for example, multiple special purpose enti-
ties.155  Behind this culture of corporate corruption were En-
ron’s Chief Operating Officer (and later CEO), Jeffrey Skilling,
its Chief Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow, and the Chairman
and CEO of Enron, Kenneth Lay.156  Of the three, Skilling was
the one who transformed the culture at Enron—for better and
worse.157  Skilling was “the man widely viewed as the brains
behind Enron’s rise.”158  He was an ardent believer in non-
traditional evaluation methods and divided the world into
“those who ‘got it’ and those who didn’t.”159  Naturally, almost
everyone wanted to be in the former group; none desired to
belong to the latter.160  Skilling’s track-record, experience, and
business philosophy made him a force within Enron.  The en-
151 Id. at 796.
152 Id. at 777.
153 Kurt Eichenwald & Jenny Anderson, How a Titan of Insurance Ran Afoul of
the Government, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/
04/business/how-a-titan-of-insurance-ran-afoul-of-the-government.html
[https://perma.cc/NV67-U8ER].
154 Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1145–46
(2005).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1144, 1202.
157 See id. at 1146–49 (describing Skilling’s role in shaping the company’s
“entrepreneurial ethos”).
158 Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Founder, Awaiting Prison, Dies in Colorado, N.Y.
TIMES (July 6, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/06/business/06en-
ron.html [https://perma.cc/CZ6B-TWRU].
159 BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 233 (2003).
160 Regan, supra note 154, at 1146. R
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tire company, including the management and the board, were
spellbound by him.161
b. Different Roles and Positions on the Corporation
Many board members also serve in key positions for the
corporations they guide and monitor.  It is not unusual for the
CEO of a company to hold a board position or even serve as the
chairperson of the board.162  In 2016, 52% of companies in the
S&P 500 Index were led by a dual Chairman/CEO.163  Simi-
larly, other board members often occupy managerial positions
and are in charge of various committees, such as the executive,
audit, risk, finance, and compensation committees.164  In their
capacity as officers, individual members are exposed to data
and analysis that are not available to other board members.
Likewise, they engage in meetings and interactions with third
parties in which their peers on the board do not partake.  Un-
surprisingly, a board member who is privy to negotiations with
a third party might become the dominant voice in board dis-
cussions concerning the desirability of the deal.
Recall that in In re Disney, the terms of Ovitz’s extravagant
compensation package were designed by Irwin Russell, a board
member, who also chaired Disney’s compensation commit-
tee.165  As chairman of the compensation committee, Russell
was “familiar with the Company’s compensation policies and
practices.”166  Naturally, he “assumed the lead role in negotiat-
ing the financial terms of [Ovitz’s] contract,”167 which, in turn,
made him “privy to a great deal of information with respect to
Ovitz.”168  Russell’s opinion thus carried a lot of weight with his
peers on the board.  In justifying the unusual compensation
161 O’Connor, supra note 33, at 1264 (discussing the respect Skilling com- R
manded at Enron and describing the “cult” culture he inculcated); see also S. REP.
NO. 107-70 at 8 (2002) [hereinafter Enron Report]; LEONARD J. BROOKS & PAUL
DUNN, BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR DIRECTORS, EXECUTIVES & ACCOUNTANTS
644 (6th ed. 2012) (“All [directors] indicated they had possessed great respect for
senior Enron officers, trusting the integrity and competence of Mr. Lay . . . Jeffrey
K. Skilling . . . Andrew S. Fastow. . . .”).
162 See Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 137, at 81 (exploring the R
“CEO-Chairman Duality”).
163 SPENCER STUART, 2016 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX: A PERSPECTIVE ON U.S.
BOARDS 8, 23 (2016) https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/pdf%20files/re
search%20and%20insight%20pdfs/spencer-stuart-us-board-index-2016_july
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/79EH-XW6C].
164 Of course, the importance of different committees may vary among firms.
165 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 702 (Del. Ch. 2005).
166 Id. at 763.
167 Id. at 702.
168 Id. at 764.
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promised to Ovitz, Russell reportedly explained that Ovitz “was
an ‘exceptional corporate executive’ who was a ‘highly success-
ful and unique entrepreneur.’”169  Given the ringing endorse-
ment of the chairman of the compensation committee, who was
intimately familiar with the details of the transaction, and the
unwavering support of Disney’s chairman and CEO (at the
time), Michael Eisner, it is little wonder that none of the other
directors went out of their way to oppose the hire or the terms
of his contract.170
Informed board members can affect the fortunes of their
uninformed colleagues in yet another way: instead of relying on
the superior information they hold to bolster their position in
board meetings, they can go in the opposite direction and influ-
ence board decisions by suppressing information from their
colleagues.  An illustration of this strategy can be found in the
case of Saito v. McCall.171  The lawsuit grew out of a problem-
atic merger between two companies, McKesson and HBOC.172
The plaintiffs claimed that the board and senior officers of
HBOC “presided over a fraudulent accounting scheme,”173 and
that McKesson’s board and officers learned of the problem dur-
ing the due diligence process, but chose to ignore it.174  The
plaintiffs further argued that after the merger the board of the
merged company did not act expeditiously enough to address
the problem.175  Three of HBOC’s directors who served on the
audit committee of the company, as well as its CEO and
chairperson of the board, Charles McCall, were fully aware of
the accounting scheme.176  The remaining directors tried to
argue that unlike their informed peers who were familiar with
the fraudulent accounting practice by virtue of their other posi-
tions, they had no knowledge of the problem as it was never
brought to their attention.177  The Chancery court rejected
their claim, ruling that “[a] reasonable inference, which the
Court is entitled to draw at this procedural stage, is that [the]
information was communicated to the other HBOC board
members who later served on McKesson HBOC’s board.”178
169 Id. at 704 (footnote omitted).
170 Id. at 710.
171 No. CIV.A. 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2004).
172 Id. at *1.
173 Id.
174 Id. at *3–4.
175 Id. at *4.
176 Id. at *3.
177 Id.
178 Id. at *7, n.68.
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The court proceeded to reject the directors’ motion to dismiss
on this count.179
c. Different Personalities
Finally, as is true in all groups, certain members of boards
of directors have a more dominant personality than others.
Steven Davidoff has suggested that personalities and egos ac-
count for many of the transactions that shaped corporate
America.180  The same is true for board decisions.  On every
board, there will be strong-minded members who assert their
views more forcefully than others.  Naturally, such board mem-
bers are likely to be more dominant in board meetings and their
opinions will carry more weight when disagreement arises.  It
should be noted that directors with dominant personalities are
also more likely to serve in key corporate positions, which fur-
ther accentuates their innate air of authority. Examples are
legion.
Begin with Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s CEO who also served
as a director.181  Skilling reportedly inculcated a “cult-like” cul-
ture within the firm.182  He was admired and feared by those
who interacted with him and almost no one wished to challenge
him.183  Thus, it should come as no surprise that, as the Enron
directors reported to the Senate, “Board votes were generally
unanimous” and directors “could recall only two instances over
the course of many years involving dissenting votes.”184  Next,
recall Michael Eisner, from Disney. Eisner served as the com-
pany’s chairperson and CEO.185  According to testimonies at
the trial, Eisner disliked dissention and “desire[d] to surround
himself with yes men.”186  Similarly, Maurice Greenberg, the
chairperson of the board and CEO of AIG, created around him
an inner circle of confidants whom he showered with re-
wards.187  In addition, Greenberg was involved in the nitty-
179 Id. at *7.
180 See STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY
DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION (2009).
181 O’Connor, supra note 33, at 1236 n.19, 1256. R
182 Id. at 1264 (quoting Joe Stephens & Peter Behr, Enron’s Culture Fed its
Demise, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A01).
183 Id.
184 Enron Report, supra note 161, at 8.
185 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 699 (Del. Ch. 2005).
186 Id. at 761 n.488.
187 See In re Am. Int’l Grp. Inc. Consol. Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763, 781
(Del. Ch. 2009) (“Greenberg could, at his sole discretion, award tens of millions of
dollars to members of his Inner Circle who stayed in his good graces.”).
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gritty of the company.188  Greenberg was perceived as a domi-
nant and omniscient figure.189  According to the Delaware
Court of Chancery, “[h]is domination even extended to the
board that was supposed to be overseeing Greenberg and the
rest of AIG’s management.  AIG’s directors were allegedly so in
Greenberg’s thrall that they avoided asking questions around
him lest they seem ignorant.”190
Another famous example is Angelo R. Mozilo from Country-
wide Financial Corp. Countrywide, one of the nation’s leading
mortgage lenders, who together with many of its directors and
officers, was found liable for issuing risky non-conforming
loans that drove the company to the verge of bankruptcy.191
Mozilo, who received the dubious title “the face of the financial
crisis,”192 was the founder of Countrywide.193  He also chaired
the company’s board of directors and acted as its CEO.194
Mozilo has been described as a person with “a desperate hun-
ger to be No. 1, which led Countrywide into a race to the bottom
as the mortgage market spiraled out of control.”195  He infected
the company with a corporate culture known as “the tyranny of
goals” and a “cult of personality.”196
In sum, the personality traits of certain directors and the
way they carry themselves around others are formative forces
that can transform decision making processes on boards.  This
is especially true when the same directors who bring a strong
personality to the board room, also serve on other key positions
on the corporation and have served on the board for a long
time.  Such directors are likely to have a disproportionate im-
pact on the decision of the board.  As we show next, individual
directors who wish to oppose them face an uphill battle.
188 See id. at 780–81 (“Not only did Greenberg run the company, he allegedly
knew everything that went on within it.”).
189 As one executive colorfully described it, “[i]f a twig snaps in a Chinese
forest, Maurice Greenberg hears it.” Id. at 781.
190 Id. at 781.
191 In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1068
(C.D. Cal. 2008).
192 Connie Bruck, Angelo’s Ashes: The Man Who Became the Face of the Finan-
cial Crisis, NEW YORKER (June 29, 2009), at 46, https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2009/06/29/angelos-ashes [https://perma.cc/5TGV-SYET].
193 John R. Emshwiller & Kara Scannell, Mozilo Agrees to Pay $67.5 Million,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2010), at 31, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
052748704300604575554321099510704 [https://perma.cc/8W9C-DLSF].
194 Countrywide, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
195 DAVID E. MCCLEAN, WALL STREET, REFORMING THE UNREFORMABLE: AN ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVE 74 (2015).
196 Id.
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2. Corporate Officers
Corporate officers differ from directors in two important
respects: first, they possess the requisite expertise to perform
their corporate roles.  As Melvin Eisenberg put it:
Unlike other professionals, directors, acting in that capacity,
are usually generalists. . . .  In contrast to directors, officers
usually are expected to have special competence and skill—
the competence and skill of managers, and, if they hold a
specialized position (such as a finance post), the competence
and skill necessary for that position.197
Second, officers are not required to make decisions collec-
tively.198  To be sure, they must abide by the policies adopted
by the board, but they typically act on their own.  Hence, corpo-
rate officers are largely protected from the pressures faced by
individual directors.
Nonetheless, there is an element of interdependence even
among corporate officers.  Each officer must rely on informa-
tional inputs she receives from her peers.  Even an accom-
plished CEO cannot be expected to do well on her job without
accurate legal advice and the full cooperation of other organs.
Likewise, other office holders critically depend on the informa-
tion and instructions they receive from the firm’s CEO and
upper management.  Firms, after all, are hierarchical in na-
ture.199  Therefore, ensuring a system of trust throughout the
firm is of paramount importance.
It should be noted in this regard that the performance of
boards is largely a function of the nature of their relationship
with other executives.  Former SEC Commissioner Bevis Long-
streth has opined that “[t]he cause of board failures is typically
their capture by executives.”200  The problem of capture is an
197 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers,
51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 951 (1990).
198 Officers are not required to make a collective decision. This is in contrast to
directors that must make a collective decision, often by voting on the matter. See,
e.g., Nadya Malenko, Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards,
27 REV. FIN. STUD. 1486, 1486 (2014) (“The board of directors is a collective
body. . . .”); see also id. at 1488 (“At the decision-making stage, all directors take
actions (e.g., vote) based on their private information and the information inferred
from the discussion, and the board’s collective decision is made.”).
199 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 403 (1937)
(demonstrating how “[w]e can best approach the question of what constitutes a
firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee’”).
200 Bevis Longstreth, Boards Fail When Executives Are Captured, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/8dc26bb4-cf1a-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef
99c77 [https://perma.cc/VB7E-BDMJ].
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intricate one and it lies beyond the scope of this Article.  How-
ever, as a matter of policy, the law should ensure that execu-
tives do not manipulate boards illicitly by negligently providing
them with inaccurate factual information and analysis or con-
cealing conflicts of interest.201
B. The Plight of Individual Directors and Corporate
Officers
The two strategies individual board members and corpo-
rate officers have at their disposal are “voice” and “exit.”202  The
voice option refers to the ability of an individual director or
officer to express her opinion about the way a company is man-
aged and exercise her voting rights on the different matters
brought before her.203  The exit option consists of the power to
resign from one’s position; it will be exercised when an individ-
ual director or officer believes that the policies adopted by her
are ruinous to the company or that she can no longer perform
the duties expected of her.204
Board decisions reflect the interaction among the individ-
ual directors and are ultimately produced via a collective deci-
sion mechanism—namely, voting.  It should be understood,
though, that collegiality norms exert constant pressure on indi-
vidual members to conform or cooperate with the other mem-
bers of the board, and not dissent.205  It must be born in mind
that directors interact on an ongoing basis.  Consequently, a
director who elects not to support her colleagues on a certain
matter runs the risk of future retaliation, consistent with the
“tit-for-tat” strategy, the dominant strategy in games with re-
201 The defense stipulated in section 141(e) of the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law that exculpates from liability directors or officers who relied in good faith
on the representations of their peers or other committee members is consistent
with our call. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2016).  However, it is difficult to
prove good faith in this context.
202 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 4 (1970).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 32 (2004) (“[E]xcept perhaps in times of crisis,
the members of the board are expected to act collegially toward one another.
According to a director who has served on the boards of several public companies,
including Marriott Corporation, ‘It is hard to explain to a person who is not a
director. It is in many ways a club.’  While each board may have slightly different
social rules, these norms tend to foster board cohesion.” (emphasis added) (foot-
note omitted)).
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peated iterations.206  Furthermore, because votes are decided
by the majority, dissension may earn a director the scorn of her
colleagues while yielding her no benefit whatsoever in terms of
charting the future course of the company.  Finally, from a
pure legal standpoint, raising objections, voting against board
resolution, and even resigning one’s post on the board does not
guarantee individual directors immunity from liability.207
1. Voice
Voice is the predominant tool of board members.  Directors
are expected to inquire about corporate policies and manage-
rial decisions, criticize them when necessary, and vote against
them if they do not deem them beneficial for the company.208
In theory, board members are at complete liberty to criticize
and dissent, but in reality directors often face strong pressure
to conform and cooperate.209  To see why, it is necessary to
take a closer look at how boards are structured and operate.
Begin with the way boards are being set up.  Board mem-
bers are not chosen arbitrarily.  They are carefully selected,
first and foremost, based on skill and experience, but also
based on personality.210  While corporations may not necessa-
rily want their boards to be populated by yes-men, who act as
human rubberstamps, they are likely to be far more disinclined
to hire professional neighsayers, who raise decision making
206 See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games,
and the Role of Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1281, 1291–95 (2003) (discussing tit-for-tat
strategy).
207 Infra notes 226–38. R
208 See Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 8 (“[I]ndividual board members provide R
advice and guidance to top managers with respect to operational and/or policy
decisions.”).
209 See, e.g., MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL
CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 50 (2000) (describing CEOs’ tendency to “re-
ward[] consent and discourag[e] conflict” among board members as a “continuing
cycle of ineffectiveness”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 32 (noting that R
“[b]oardroom culture encourages groupthink. Boards emphasize politeness and
courtesy at the expense of oversight”); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Indepen-
dence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 810–11 (2001) (arguing that the
psychological influence of small groups leads to “groupthink” and censorship);
O’Connor, supra note 33, at 1261–69 (identifying the three antecedent conditions R
for groupthink as cohesiveness, structural faults in a group’s decision making
process, and the need to make consequential decisions during a time of high
stress).
210 See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psycholog-
ical Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83, 91 (1985) (“[T]he board nominee’s personality should be compatible
with that of the current directors.”).
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and operation costs.211  From a personality standpoint, corpo-
rations would prefer to hire reasonable people who are per-
ceived as team players.212  Understanding this, board
candidates, for their part, have an inherent incentive to adopt a
cooperative posture when interviewing for a board position and
to not act in an obstructionist manner after they are
appointed.213
In this vein, it should be noted that leading commentators
have advanced a far bleaker view of directors’ selection and
appointment.  The conventional wisdom among corporate
scholars suggests that directors play a pivotal role in ap-
pointing their peers.214  Dissenting directors, therefore, face
the risk of not being reelected.  Aware of this fact, directors who
wish to be reelected—a desire most directors are presumed to
have215—will strive not to cross their peers or even upset them.
Furthermore, dissention also diminishes a director’s prospects
of serving on other companies’ boards. Cassandra D. Marshall,
in her empirical analysis of the job prospects of dissenting
directors, found that “[o]n average, dissenting directors experi-
ence a net loss in board seats of 85% over the next five
years.”216  Hence, directors have an inherent incentive to ap-
pease their colleagues.  The modus operandi on many boards is
one of cooperation.217
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 This is especially true given that while serving on the board, even dissent-
ing directors do not necessarily have real impact on the decisions voted in the
board. See, e.g., Wei Jiang, Hualin Wan & Shan Zhao, Reputation Concerns of
Independent Directors: Evidence from Individual Director Voting, 29 REV. FIN. STUD.
655 (2016) (examining the voting behavior of independent directors of public
companies in China and finding that 92% of proposals they examined eventually
passed despite dissention); see also Miriam Schwartz-Ziv & Michael S. Weisbach,
What do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings, 108 J. FIN.
ECON. 349 (2013) (analyzing board minutes of Israeli government-owned firms and
reporting that even when directors voice concerns in meetings, they ultimately
vote with management).
214 See e.g., Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic
Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 58 (2d ed., 2009) (noting
that “ordinarily the board proposes the company’s slate of nominees, which is
rarely opposed at the annual shareholders meeting” (internal citation omitted));
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 205, at 25 (concluding that “candidates placed on R
the company’s slate by the board [are] virtually assured of being reelected”).
215 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 205, at 25 (“That directors have a desire to be R
reelected is clear.”).
216 See Marshall, supra note 142. R
217 Cox & Munsinger, supra note 210, at 91  (explaining that in selecting board
members firms look for nominees whose “personality should be compatible with
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Furthermore, the nature of the interaction among board
members further incentivizes individual directors to cooper-
ate.218  Board members interact with each other on a continu-
ous basis.  An individual director who actively opposes a
resolution that is spearheaded or backed by other directors
may well find her future initiatives thwarted by her peers.  As
extensive game theoretic literature demonstrates, actors in re-
peated interactions tend to be cooperative if their counterparts
are cooperative and non-cooperative when faced with non-co-
operative behavior on the part of their peers.219  Consequently,
a director who ponders opposing her colleagues on the board
must take into consideration not only the expected present cost
associated with non-cooperation, but also the expected future
cost and compare them to the expected benefit.  Only if the
expected benefit from dissention in the instant case outweighs
the aggregate expected cost she should dissent.  Thus, individ-
ual directors should dissent only in cases that are really impor-
tant to them.  Otherwise, it pays off to maintain solidarity with
the other members of the board in the hope that they will
reciprocate in the future.
The predisposition of individual directors to conform is am-
plified when a matter brought before the board falls squarely
within another directors’ field of expertise.  Deference to exper-
tise is a well-known phenomenon.220  It marks all human inter-
actions including interactions among directors.221  Opposing
an expert requires considerable investment of resources.  A
board member who wishes to oppose a director who is consid-
ered an expert will need to study the expert’s field and then
expend time and effort swaying the other members of the
board, who are predisposed to accept the view of the expert.  It
must be born in mind, though, that directors hardly ever get a
realistic chance to do their own research on topics of disagree-
that of the current directors” and who are likely to “cooperate with other board
members in reaching decisions by group consensus”).
218 See Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 32 (noting that board culture emphasizes R
“cooperation norms” leading to groupthink).
219 Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211
SCI. 1390, 1390–91 (1981).
220 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent 18 ((Univ. of Chi. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 34, 2002), https://chicagounbound.uchi
cago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory/68 [https://perma.cc/U8PX-4NHF] (ex-
plaining that “[w]hen the morality of a situation is not clear, people might well be
influenced by someone who seems to be an expert, able to weigh the risks
involved”).
221 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 205, at 32 (discussing how board mem- R
bers naturally defer to the CEO as a source of expertise).
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ment.  They often operate under severe time constraints that
reinforce the tendency to abide by the judgment of experts.222
Similarly, when a board member relies on private informa-
tion (as opposed to general or specific expertise) that bears on
the matter before the board, it is nearly impossible to contest
her view without access to the sources of the relevant private
information.  The need to act expeditiously, the lack of inde-
pendent resources, and the norm of interpersonal trust make it
very difficult for individual directors to contradict, or even chal-
lenge, peers who rely on private information sources.223
2. Exit
Ostensibly, exit is a straightforward solution for directors
who do not see eye to eye with their peers.  Upon closer inspec-
tion, however, it becomes apparent that resigning from a board
is not a costless option.  A director who resigns from a board is
likely to pay a reputational price, especially if the decision over
which she left is perceived as a standard decision by the
outside world.  Under such circumstances, the resigning direc-
tor may be perceived as a “quitter,” who cannot accept los-
ing.224  Such portrayal, in turn, can adversely affect her
prospects of serving on other boards.225
Worse yet, two recent decisions of the Chancery court sug-
gest the taking the “exit” route will not necessarily immunize a
director from liability.  The first, In re Puda Coal Stockholders’
Litigation,226 involved a claim of oversight failure against Puda
222 For discussion of the effect of time constraints on independent directors
see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 205, at 36–37 (noting that most independent R
directors have full-time careers of their own).
223 Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Gov-
ernance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1183–84 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he chances that
groupthink will occur increase in the absence of methodical decision-making
procedures if the leader exhibits a ‘closed’ leadership style or if decision-makers
lack sufficient information to enable them to arrive at an independent decision”
(footnotes omitted)).
224 William O. Brown & Michael T. Maloney, Exit, Voice, and the Role of Corpo-
rate Directors: Evidence from Acquisition Performance 6 (Claremont Colls. Working
Papers 1997–27, 1999), https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=953
069091068004126079120088111076085010081072032058071029065118
1241250901180120260090711010640170940230180040860851211210730
9409007010008609407709310607101108802512008601510210311411407
3&EXT=pdf [https://perma.cc/MT4Q-8QR4] (“It is also possible that resignation
from a board of directors may leave the director with an unwanted reputation as a
quitter or as being weak.”).
225 Bar-Hava, Gu & Lev, supra note 138, at 3  (observing that “a director’s R
resignation likely affects negatively his/her reputation (rumored to be a trouble-
maker, not a team player)”).
226 No. 6476-CS, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 388 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013).
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Coal’s directors who failed to notice an extended series of un-
authorized transfers of assets by the company’s CEO and
chairman of the board.227  When the independent directors fi-
nally learned of the problem, they strove to conduct an investi-
gation of the matter, but their attempt was thwarted.228  In
response, the individual directors decided to resign from the
board.229  In rejecting the independent directors’ motion to dis-
miss the suit against them, Chancellor Leo E. Strine Jr. criti-
cized the independent directors’ decision to resign as it resulted
in the abandonment of the company “under the sole dominion
of a [CEO/chairman] they believe has pervasively breached his
fiduciary duty of loyalty.”230  The correct course of action for
the independent directors, per Chancellor Strine, was to influ-
ence the company to join the lawsuit.231  Resigning was not
only the wrong thing to do, but may have also constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty.232
The second case, Rich v. Chong,233 emerged when the audi-
tors of Fuqi International, a Delaware company, uncovered that
it made unauthorized cash transfers to third parties in the total
amount of approximately $130 million.234  A stockholders’ suit
from 2010 led to the opening of an investigation by the audit
committee.235  The investigation was subsequently abandoned,
which led the independent directors of the companies to re-
sign.236  In this case, too, the chancery court refused to exoner-
ate the resigning directors.237  Vice Chancellor Glascock wrote
“a conscious failure to act, in the face of a known duty, is a
breach of the duty of loyalty.”238
Exit is therefore far from being a panacea for individual
directors.  Directors wishing to exercise their exit options must
be mindful of the consequences of their actions.  Resigning over
a mundane decision when a company is doing well may inflict a
serious reputational cost on the existing director.  Quitting over
a serious matter when the company is facing hard times may
even trigger legal liability.
227 Id. at *2–3.
228 Id. at *2.
229 Id. at *12–13
230 Id. at *13.
231 Id. at *20.
232 Id. at *19–20.
233 Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l. Inc. v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2013).
234 Id. at 966, 984.
235 Id. at 966.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 986.
238 Id. at 984.
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IV
INCORPORATING A FIDUCIARY DUTY AMONG DIRECTORS
AND OFFICERS
The duty of care and duty of loyalty are the two principal
vehicles by which the law regulates the behavior of directors
and corporate officers.239  Yet, they only apply vertically toward
the corporation and the shareholders.  At present, they owe no
fiduciary duty to one another.240  In this part, we call for the
introduction of a horizontal fiduciary duty among corporate
officers and directors toward one another.
While, at first blush, this idea may appear radical, it is not.
The concept of fiduciary duty is flexible and open-ended.241
This is no accident.  Fiduciary duties cover a broad range of
relationships, each of which presents ever changing circum-
stances that require the fiduciary to make decisions in the best
interest of the beneficiary.242  Given the nature and scope of
the cases covered by fiduciary duties, it is unsurprising that
judges and legislators have elected to imbue the concept with a
substantial degree of flexibility, making it an adaptable tool
that can fit a wide array of cases.243  As the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court famously wrote in In re Estate of Scott “[t]he con-
cept of a confidential relationship cannot be reduced to a
catalogue of specific circumstances, invariably falling to the left
or right of a definitional line.”244  Echoing the same sentiment,
Deborah DeMott observed that “the fiduciary obligation is a
device that enables the law to respond to a range of situations
in which, for a variety of reasons, one person’s discretion ought
to be controlled because of characteristics of that person’s rela-
tionship with another.”245
239 See Eisenberg, supra note 197, at 945 (listing the duties of care and loyalty
alongside the “duty to act lawfully”).
240 See supra Part I, at 7–8.
241 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Eco-
nomic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046–47 (1991)
(explaining that a “fiduciary should manage the [beneficiary’s] asset in the benefi-
ciary’s best interests . . . however, the fiduciary’s obligations are open-ended.
Because asset management necessarily involves risk and uncertainty, the specific
behavior of the fiduciary cannot be dictated [by specific rules] in advance”).
242 See id. at 1045–46 (identifying familiar forms of fiduciary relationships
such as director-officer and partner-partnership).
243 See Frankel, supra note 59, at 825–26 (describing how fiduciary duties can R
vary based on the fiduciary relationship, and how courts may even defer to the
fiduciary where this deference would benefit the beneficiary).
244 In re Estate of Scott, 316 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. 1974).
245 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J 879, 915 (1988).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 40 31-JUL-19 13:09
842 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:803
In general, fiduciary relationships arise when one party
(the fiduciary) acts on behalf of another (the beneficiary) while
exercising some discretion or power about how to perform her
obligations in furtherance of the beneficiary’s interests.246  Fi-
duciary obligations pervade a variety of legal fields, contexts
and situations “as a feature of interpersonal relationships.”247
Fiduciary relationships come in two varieties: formal and infor-
mal.248  Formal fiduciary relationships are categorical in na-
ture and are present in certain types of relationships, such as
attorney-client, trustee-beneficiary, and corporate officers-
shareholders.249  Informal fiduciary relationships (often re-
ferred to as “confidential relationships”) are circumstantial in
their nature and derive from courts’ qualitative evaluation of
specific interpersonal interactions.250
The key to judicial findings of informal fiduciary relation-
ships is the concept of trust.251  As Professor Gordon Smith
writes, “[a]lthough definitions of ‘trust’ vary, the term usually
connotes some measure of vulnerability that emanates from
the lack of legal or other protection against harm.”252  He pro-
ceeds to note that many commentators have argued that “trust
246 See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4
(1975) (describing the elements of the fiduciary relationship); see also Paul B.
Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 261 (2011) (positioning
the discretionary power “wielded by fiduciaries over beneficiaries” as a central
element of the fiduciary relationship).
247 Paul B. Miller, Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
FIDUCIARY LAW 182 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018), https://www
.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781784714826/9781784714826.xml [https://
perma.cc/6X3F-XTGZ].
248 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1412 (2002) (explaining that “courts sensibly divide the uni-
verse of fiduciary relationships into two parts: ‘formal’ fiduciary relationships and
‘informal’ fiduciary relationships”).
249 For those relationships see, e.g., Frankel, supra note 59, at 795 (describing R
various forms of fiduciary relationships); Andrew S. Gold, Interpreting Fiduciary
Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S.
Gold, eds., 2018) (analyzing how differing interpretive methodologies shape our
understanding of fiduciary law); Smith, supra note 248, at 1412 (distinguishing
between formal and informal fiduciary relationships).
250 For a discussion in the classification of formal and informal fiduciary rela-
tionship, see Smith, supra note 248, at 1412–13 (defining “formal” fiduciary rela- R
tionships as easily recognizable cases like trustee-beneficiary or guardian-ward).
Courts typically attempt to explain why fiduciary duties are imposed in informal
fiduciary relationship (formal fiduciary relationships are considered fiduciary in
nature).  In doing so, they use common elements such as “(1) ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’
reposed by one person in another; and (2) the resulting ‘domination,’ ‘superiority,’
or ‘undue influence’ of the other.” Id. at 1413–14 (footnotes omitted).
251 See id. at 1413–14 (listing trust as a necessary factor in judicial findings of
informal fiduciary relationships).
252 Id. at 1418 (footnotes omitted).
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is pervasive in commercial relationships” and in “relational
contract[s].”253
Recent years have witnessed a spate of calls to recognize
new fiduciary duties in a myriad of legal contexts.  For example,
Max Schanzenbach and Nadav Shoked have argued for the
formalization of a fiduciary duty between officials and citizens
in the municipal realm.254  Similarly, Margaret Brinig has pro-
posed that foster parents be viewed as fiduciaries of their chil-
dren.255  Finally, Ethan J. Lieb has called for the establishment
of a fiduciary obligation among friends.256
We do not seek to push the boundaries of fiduciary law or
extend it to new legal fields.  Quite the contrary, our proposal
comes within the ambit of the concept of fiduciary duty, as it
was originally conceived.  Our core innovation is to take the
fiduciary model that exists in our corporate law and apply it
horizontally.  It bears emphasis that the concept of horizontal
fiduciary duties is not new to the law.257  It is not even new in
the context of organizational law.258  A fiduciary duty exists—
indeed, has always existed—among the members of a partner-
ship.259  And partnerships belong in the same legal family as
corporations.260
253 Id.
254 Max Schanzenbach & Nadav Shoked, Reclaiming Fiduciary Law for the
City, 70 STAN. L. REV. 565, 575–78 (2018).
255 Margaret F. Brinig, Parents: Trusted but not Trustees or (Foster) Parents as
Fiduciaries, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011).  The idea was inspired by the work of
Elizabeth and Robert Scott, who, sixteen years earlier, applied fiduciary principles
to biological parents. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents As Fiducia-
ries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2402 (1995) (“Characterizing parents as fiduciaries
suggests that the parent-child relationship shares important features with other
legal relationships that have been similarly defined . . . . Basic structural similari-
ties are apparent.”).
256 Ethan J. Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 686–700
(2009).
257 See Smith, supra note 248, at 1457 (noting the common-law origins of R
fiduciary duties in the partnership context).
258 Id.
259 See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) (1994); ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.07(a) (Supp. 2004-2) (stating
that “partners owe fiduciary duties to each other and to the partnership”); Smith,
supra note 248, at 1458 (“The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty describes R
the structure of relationships in which courts apply fiduciary law.  Partnerships
fit easily within that structure, and courts predictably impose fiduciary duties in
the partnership context.”); Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership
Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 825, 848 (1990) (stating
that section 21(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act “has been treated by courts as
the statutory foundation for powerful fiduciary duties among partners, particu-
larly duties of loyalty”).
260 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise
of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1338 n.8 (2006) (concluding definitively that a
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Corporate officers and especially directors can be readily
analogized to partners who strive to achieve a common goal.  To
succeed in their quest, they must work together and trust each
other.  Corporate officers and directors typically have limited
access to external expertise and are forced to rely on the collec-
tive knowledge and business acumen that exists within the
corporation.  As importantly, often, they cannot be effectively
expected to challenge the integrity of their peers.  In all relevant
respects, therefore, corporate officers and directors are not dif-
ferent from partners.  The time has come for the law to recog-
nize this fact and impose fiduciary obligations on corporate
officers and directors vis-à-vis one another.
Of course, this call of ours does not mark the end of the
discussion.  In an oft-cited paragraph, Justice Frankfurter
wrote: “to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it
gives direction to further inquiry.  To whom is he a fiduciary?
What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?  In what respect
has he failed to discharge these obligations?  And what are the
consequences of his deviation from duty?”261  Heeding these
sage words of advice, in the proceeding paragraphs we address
these matters.
Under the legal regime we envision, directors and corporate
officers would owe a fiduciary duty to one another.  As is the
case with horizontal fiduciary duties, the implementation of
our model would result in a system of reciprocal obligations
that would apply among the corporate officers and directors.  A
breach by one member of the group would therefore allow any
of the other members to sue her.  Each beneficiary would be at
liberty to exercise (or not to exercise) her cause of action.
It is important to emphasize that the horizontal fiduciary
duty we propose would complement, not replace, the fiduciary
duty that corporate officers and directors already owe to the
corporation.  Violations of the horizontal fiduciary duty will
therefore give rise to an independent cause of action that is
distinct from that of the corporation.  As we will explain, it is
possible that an act or omission committed by a corporate of-
ficer or director would constitute a breach of both fiduciary
duties.  This would transpire, for example, if a corporate officer
fails to disclose a conflict of interest or acts recklessly.  In such
cases, the fiduciary would be liable both to her peers and to the
partnership like a corporation is an independent legal “entity, albeit a weak one,
and has been so under Anglo-American law since it acquired a rule of weak entity
shielding more than 300 years ago”).
261 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943).
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corporation and would be exposed to two independent suits.  A
decision by the corporation to not bring a derivative suit would
not stand as a bar to a possible suit by the corporation’s of-
ficers and directors.  Nor will the corporation’s approval be a
prerequisite for the filing of a suit for a breach of a horizontal
fiduciary obligation.
In terms of the substance of the new fiduciary duty we
propose, we believe that it should track as closely as possible
the vertical fiduciary duty directors and officers owe the corpo-
ration.  Keeping the two duties as similar as possible would
minimize the burden and cost the new duty would impose on
corporate officers and directors and facilitate compliance.  Ac-
cordingly, the new duty we envision will be comprised of a duty
of loyalty and duty of care.  It would require officers and direc-
tors not to fail their peers in their common quest to pilot the
corporation to success. As far as the loyalty aspect is con-
cerned, it will be modelled on the more minimalist conception
of conflict avoidance.  Duty-bearers would be under an obliga-
tion to disclose to their peers all potential conflicts of interest
that may compromise their commitment to the joint mission of
serving the corporation.  The existence of a potential conflict
would not in itself bar a corporate office or a director from
carrying out her duties.  The same approval mechanisms that
corporate law currently employs to address vertical conflicts of
interest would also apply to horizontal ones.  In this case,
therefore, the recognition of a horizontal fiduciary duty would
not impose additional costs on the corporation and its organs
and will not impede decision making processes.
As for the duty of care, under our conceptualization the
horizontal duty of care would closely mimic the traditional ver-
tical duty that has long been in place.  It would require duty
bearers to act in a skillful and responsible manner and avoid
negligent, reckless, or intentional behavior that might prevent
their colleagues from preforming their task or compromise
their ability to carry them out successfully.  Breaches of the
duty would consist of failure to inform oneself prior to making a
decision, or voting on a matter brought before her, breaking the
law or disregarding regulations that pertain to the corporation
and its activities and failure to exercise independent judgment
as required by the law.
As we already explained, lack of candor concerning poten-
tial conflicts and actions and omissions falling below the stan-
dard of behavior expected of skilled corporate officers and
directors would give rise to potential liability under our propo-
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sal.  It is critical to understand that while our proposal in-
creases the exposure of corporate officers and directors to legal
liability, it neither changes the nature of their fiduciary obliga-
tions, nor does it require them to discharge their duties differ-
ently.  The principal effect of our proposal in this context is to
enlarge the group of potential plaintiffs who can sue for a
breach.
As for remedies, the standard remedy for breaches of the
proposed horizontal fiduciary duty would be damages.
Breaches of the horizontal duty of care would entitle the benefi-
ciaries to monetary damages.  Breaches of the duty of loyalty
would be remedied either by damages or by disgorgement of
profits.  It should be noted in this context that even though the
same act or omission may constitute a breach of both the verti-
cal and horizontal fiduciary duties, the resulting harm may
vary in each case.  Breaches of the duty of loyalty may result in
significant harm to the corporation if it lost a lucrative business
opportunity, while inflicting only a modest harm on the corpo-
rate officers and directors.262  Contrariwise, an erroneous deci-
sion on the part of the board of directors, resulting from a
breach of the duty of care by a board member, may occasion a
small economic loss on the corporation and a significant
reputational harm on the other, non-negligent directors.263
The implementation of our proposal would yield four im-
portant benefits to corporate governance.  First, it would im-
prove information flows within the firm.  By making directors
and officers accountable to one another, the new duty would
give them additional motivation to be scrupulous and diligent
in performing their corporate roles.  Second, the new cause of
action we seek to introduce would allow directors and officers
to clear themselves from guilt of fault, irrespective of the ac-
tions of the corporation.  Importantly, this would enable indi-
vidual officers and directors to protect their personal
reputation when their peers lead the firm astray.  Third, al-
lowing individual directors and officers to prove in court that
they did not breach their fiduciary duty to the firm should
make it easier for corporations to attract honest directors and
officers.  Fourth, the introduction of a horizontal fiduciary duty
would improve judicial oversight of firms.  Corporate officers
262 See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (noting that the duty of loyalty
requires officers “to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might
properly bring to it”).
263 See Ibrahim, supra note 37, at 967 (noting that courts often leave breaches R
of the duty of care to “market, reputational, and social sanctions”).
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and directors know more about their firm than anyone else and
can bring to light evidence that other plaintiffs may not be able
to produce.
It should be emphasized that the aim of our proposal is not
to increase litigation ex post, but rather, to provide better ex
ante incentives to corporate officers and directors to act dili-
gently and faithfully.
V
EXCULPATION, INSURANCE, AND INDEMNIFICATION
One may argue against our proposal, reasoning that its
main effect would be to impose additional cost on corporations.
The introduction of the new fiduciary duty we propose would
prompt corporations to purchase for their officers and directors
insurance policies that would guarantee them full reimburse-
ment in the case of a judgment against them.264  Similarly,
corporations would promise to indemnify officers and directors
for their litigation costs.265  Some would even argue that corpo-
rations would rush to waive officers and directors liability by
incorporating exculpating clauses into their contracts.266
Hence, so the argument goes, the net effect of our proposal
would be to burden corporations, without affecting the behav-
ior of officers and directors.  These arguments are greatly over-
stated and, in fact, largely miss the mark for the reasons we
explain below.
A. Exculpation
Although exculpation clauses have become part of the lay
of the corporate law land,267 they will not have an effect in their
264 See, e.g., Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Direc-
tor Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1074–76 (2006) (reporting that the actual risk
for outside directors of personally contributing to settlements out of their own
pockets, is low due to directors and officers insurance policy).
265 JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 6.01–02 (1981); see also Kurt A. Mayr II, Indemni-
fication of Directors and Officers: The Double Whammy of Mandatory Indemnifica-
tion Under Delaware Law in Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 42 VILL. L.
REV. 223, 224 n.4 (1997) (summarizing indemnification clauses in corporate laws
of leading states in the United States).
266 In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholders Litig., 115 A.3d 1173
(Del. 2015) (“A plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead non-excul-
pated claims against a director who is protected by an exculpatory charter provi-
sion to survive a motion to dismiss, regardless of the underlying standard of
review for the board’s conduct—be it Revlon Unocal, the entire fairness standard,
or the business judgment rule.” (footnotes omitted)).
267 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007) (authorizing exculpation
clauses for corporate directors).
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familiar form on the horizontal fiduciary duty that we propose.
A corporation can only waive a duty that it is owed.268  It can-
not waive a duty that is owed to its officers and directors.  To
argue otherwise evinces a complete misperception of the nature
of the corporation as a separate legal entity, as well as of that of
rights and duties.  Only the officers and directors to whom the
duty is owed can waive the right.  Whether or not they would
decide waive their right in the case of a breach is an empirical
question.  It should be noted in this context that, as we dis-
cussed in Part II, officers and directors are not a monolithic
group.  Individuals serving on those positions have divergent
preferences and different attitudes toward risk.  Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect that certain officers and directors would
waive the right, while others would not.  And herein lies the key
difference between our proposed horizontal right and the tradi-
tional vertical one.  Unlike the vertical fiduciary duty that is
owed to a single beneficiary—the firm—the horizontal fiduciary
duty would create many beneficiaries.  It is enough that some
of them would decide not to waive it to keep it in effect.  Only a
full waiver by all of the right holders would keep the breach
from being challenged.
Furthermore, it bears emphasis that even under extant
law, exculpation clauses do not apply to corporate officers.269
Corporate officers cannot be relieved of their fiduciary obliga-
tions.270  In so far as directors are concerned, exculpation
clauses only apply to breaches of the duty of care.271  Viola-
tions of the duty of loyalty, or “acts or omissions [made] not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a know-
ing violation of law” are nonexculpable.272
Similarly, we would make breaches of the duty loyalty
nonexculpable.  This would mean that even if corporate officers
and directors wished to release their peers of the obligation to
act loyally in the interactions amongst themselves and in ex-
268 See, e.g., Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary
Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017) (discussing how companies and directors and manag-
ers can contract out specific fiduciary duties owned to the companies).
269 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2007) (applying only to exculpa-
tion of corporate directors).
270 See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009) (“[T]here
currently is no statutory provision authorizing comparable exculpation of corpo-
rate officers.”).
271 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007).
272 Id. For a detailed description of the Delaware exculpatory clause, see ED-
WARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW GCL-
21–GCL-24 (2016) (discussing which types of claims are non-exculpable).
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change be relieved of their obligation act in the same way, they
will have no power to do so.  Hence, the effect of exculpation
clauses, even if they are adopted, would be limited to breaches
of the duty of liability.
Finally, as Julian Velasco reminds us, even in the context
of the duty of care, an exculpation provision “may eliminate
personal liability for breach of the duty of care, [but] it does not
eliminate the duty of care itself.”273  Thus, courts are not
barred from awarding injunctive relief for breaches of the
duty.274  In our opinion, the same rule should apply to exculpa-
tion clauses that pertain to the horizontal duty of care.  They
should stand as no bar to injunctive relief.
For all these reasons, the effect of exculpatory provisions
on our proposal should be quite modest.  This, in turn, should
lower the motivation of corporate officers and directors to insist
on such provisions.  As we explained, exculpatory provisions
will immunize corporate officers and directors from litigation
only if all their peers agree to them.  Attempts to achieve this
result through voluntary negotiations will likely be stifled by
collective action problems and even if these problems can be
overcome the impact of these provisions would be rather
modest.
B. Insurance
Directors and officers insurance has become part and par-
cel of the corporate world.275  Corporations routinely insure
directors and officers against liability arising from breaches of
their duty of care.276  If our proposal is adopted, it is reasonable
to expect that corporations would also purchase insurance
against breaches of the horizontal fiduciary duty.  One may
therefore oppose our proposal on the grounds that it would
273 Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?,
83 S. CAL. L. REV 1231, 1256 (2010).
274 Id. (noting that “injunctive relief is not precluded”).
275 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicating Corporate Governance Risk: Evi-
dence From the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
487, 487 (2007) (arguing that “[n]early all public corporations purchase D&O
policies” and referring to Tillinghast Towers Perrin, 2005 Directors and Officers
Liability Survey 20 fig.21 (2006) (“reporting that 100 percent of public company
respondent in both the U.S. and Canada purchased D&O insurance”)).
276 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Govern-
ance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1801 (2007)
(“D&O insurance protects corporate officers and directors and the corporation
itself from liabilities arising as a result of the conduct of directors and officers in
their official capacity.”).
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have little effect on corporate officers and directors.  This argu-
ment proves too much and too little at once.
It is noteworthy that this argument casts doubt on the
desirability of other types of insurance.277  It can be argued
with equal force that automobile insurance removes drivers’
incentive to drive carefully and that property insurance makes
property owners apathetic about damages to their property.
This conclusion is unwarranted.
First, the argument that the availability of insurance would
make corporate officers and directors indifferent about the new
fiduciary duty we propose is predicated on the assumption that
all corporations would buy insurance for the relevant actors.
There is no a priori reason to assume this.  Corporations may
or may not respond to our proposal by purchasing additional
insurance for their officers and directors.  It is equally possible
that corporate officers and directors would prefer not to forego
the option to be insured in exchange for higher pay.278
Second, insurance policies do not offer those insured pro-
phylactic protection against liability.  Insurance policies incor-
porate multiple exclusions and limitations.279  Such exclusions
and limitations are intended to combat the moral hazard prob-
lem that attends all insurance arrangements.280  In our con-
text, directors and officers insurance policies do not cover
277 It is interesting to note that in the former Soviet Union there was a com-
plete ban on liability coverage. See Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the
Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 166, 166
(2000) (noting that liability insurance might be considered “socially undesirable”
since it potentially reduces policy holders’ liability costs).
278 In this regard, see, e.g., Canice Prendergast, The Tenuous Trade-off Be-
tween Risk and Incentives, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1071, 1071 (2002) (demonstrating
how “the cost of offering a pay-for-performance contract to a (risk-averse) em-
ployee is that it imposes risk on his compensation, which causes higher wage
costs”).
279 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 276, at 1804–05 (“The principal exclu-
sions are for claims involving fraud or personal enrichment, claims either noticed
or pending prior to the commencement of the policy period, and claims between
insured persons.” (footnotes omitted)).
280 In the context of insurance, “moral hazard refers . . . to the tendency of
insurance protection to alter an individual’s motive to prevent loss.”  Steven
Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979). See also
Richard Zeckhauser, Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between
Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 10, 10 (1970) (argu-
ing that health insurance incentivizes individuals towards “overexpenditure” but
is necessary for effective risk-spreading); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral
Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996) (‘“[M]oral hazard’ refers to the tendency
for insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of
loss.”).
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harms resulting from intentional acts and omissions.281  More-
over, since the line between negligence and gross negligence is
not readily ascertainable,282 those insured may rationally
strive to refrain from acting negligently despite the existence of
insurance.
Third, and finally, the cost of insurance does not remain
steady.283  The premium insureds have to pay depends on their
past record.284  A corporate officer or director who was found
liable by a court and sought payment from her insurance com-
pany for the damages she was ordered to pay will see her pre-
mium go up precipitously.285  This, in turn, will make her less
employable relatively as the cost of hiring her would be higher
relative to candidates with a clean record.  Furthermore, insur-
ance cannot expunge the reputational stain that attaches to a
corporate officer or director who breached a fiduciary duty.
Consequently, the availability of insurance should not lead cor-
porate officers and directors to ignore their fiduciary duties vis-
à-vis one another.
C. Indemnification
Indemnification provisions allow corporate officers and di-
rectors to receive reimbursement from their corporations for
the expenditures they incur in civil and criminal proceed-
ings.286  They enable officers and directors to secure effective
281 Baker & Griffith, supra note 276, at 1820 (“[T]he D&O policy contains a
moral hazard exclusion: the fraud exclusion against liability based on a ‘dishon-
est, fraudulent, criminal act or omission or willful violation of any statute, rule or
law.’”).
282 See Velasco, supra note 273, at 1250 (“[T]he standard of conduct for the
duty of care requires that each director act as an ordinarily careful and prudent
person in similar circumstances, but the standard of review requires the share-
holders to prove that the directors were grossly negligent . . . .”).
283 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 276, at 1820–21 (“D&O insurance policies R
are re-priced once a year. . . .  Re-pricing allows the insurer to take any increased
hazard (moral or otherwise) into account.”).
284 Id.
285 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors’ and Officers’
Liability Insurance, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1989) (“In all likelihood, however, the
most important impetus for the recent ratchet in D&O insurance premiums is the
sheer increase in the number of claims filed against directors.”); see also TOWERS
WATSON DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY: 2012 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 11
(2013) (“Nearly 30% of public companies indicated their premiums had increased,
slightly more than double the 14% response in 2011.”); see also Jane Croft,
Insurance: Directors Take Action Against Rising Tide of Litigation, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
29, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/b6920752-a678-11e2-bc0b-00144feabd
c0 [https://perma.cc/UP7K-CBYE] (noting that “in certain sectors, such as finan-
cial services, premiums are rising because of the recent spate of scandals and
insurers’ increasing nervousness about offering cover”).
286 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2007).
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legal representation when sued or investigated and let their
corporations foot the bill.287  Given the prevalence of indemnifi-
cation provisions, it is reasonable to expect that indemnifica-
tion would be offered, at least in some cases, to corporate
officers and directors who get sued for violations of the horizon-
tal fiduciary duty.  This, in turn, would increase the financial
burden placed on corporations.  The magnitude of the increase
would depend on three factors: first, the number of corpora-
tions that would offer officers and directors indemnification.
Second, the cap that corporations set on indemnification
amounts.  Third, the number of suits filed.
As for the first factor, it should be noted that many of the
acts and omissions that would trigger liability under our propo-
sal involve bad faith.  Hence, they would not give rise to indem-
nification claims.288  The second factor, the amount at which
indemnification would be capped, is an empirical matter.  Nat-
urally, we expect the amount to vary dramatically among firms,
depending, inter alia, on their size.  As for the third factor, we
would like to emphasize once again that the point and purpose
of our proposal to introduce a horizontal fiduciary duty into
corporate law is not to increase operation costs for corpora-
tions, but rather to improve decision making within corpora-
tions and thereby enhance their profits and the returns of their
shareholders.  The introduction of a horizontal fiduciary duty is
intended to deter wrongdoing and carelessness among corpo-
rate officers and directors.  We expect the horizontal fiduciary
duty to reinforce the vertical fiduciary duty.  Making corporate
officers and directors accountable to one another would induce
them to act better in furthering the interests of the sharehold-
ers.  Hence, if our proposal is implemented, it should be ex-
pected to increase the revenues of corporations, not their costs.
CONCLUSION
The rise of criminal and administrative enforcement cam-
paigns against corporations has increased the level of inter-
287 See Mayr II, supra note 265, at 230 (noting the “specter of the enormous
attorney fees associated with defending against” claims against corporate direc-
tors and officers).
288 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2007) (“A corporation shall have the
power to indemnify any person . . . if the person acted in good faith and in a
manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest
of the corporation.”); see also WELCH ET AL., supra note 272, at GCL-443 (discuss-
ing individuals’ rights to indemnify themselves from a corporation).
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dependence among corporate officers and directors.289  A
wrong committed by a corporate officer or director often results
in a collective mark of Caine that attaches to all directors and
officers of the corporation.  Yet, since corporate officers and
directors currently owe a fiduciary duty only to the firm, not to
one another, corporate officers and directors have no indepen-
dent cause of action against the wrongdoer.  In this Article, we
argued that the time has come to rectify this state of affairs by
making corporate officers and directors fiduciaries not only of
the firm but also of one another.  Recognition of a horizontal
fiduciary duty would not only allow individual directors and
corporate officers to exonerate themselves from allegations of
wrongdoing ex post, but would also improve corporate govern-
ance ex ante.  The success of firms critically depends on the
ability of their officers and directors to work together and trust
each other.  Our proposal is intended to enable corporate of-
ficers and directors to trust one another and thereby decrease
the cost and improve the quality of corporate governance.
289 See Koehler, supra note 70, at 531–38 (highlighting the disparity between R
corporate enforcement actions and related prosecutions of individual company
employees).
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